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Abstract 
The 2014 Ebola crisis killed 11,315 people across 6 countries, making it the deadliest 
crisis globally since the virus was discovered in 1976. However, the roles played by 
nonmedical emergency management agencies (EMAs) in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
during that crisis remain unknown. The purpose of this study was to bridge the gap in 
knowledge by documenting the roles which were played or should have been played 
by EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone in responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis 
involving policymaking in emergency management (EM). The research questions 
focused on the roles that were played or should have been played by EMAs in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, as well as similar agencies in West Africa in responding to the 
Ebola crisis.  This study was a generic qualitative inquiry grounded in the 
functionalist theory. Purposeful sampled interviews with 12 EM experts from Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Ghana were used. An inductive thematic analytical approach was 
used in the data analysis. The results showed that EMAs played crucial roles in 
coordination, communication, and control of the movement of people. The study also 
revealed that EMAs should have planned for unfamiliar hazards before the Ebola 
crisis. Further, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) should 
have ensured the synergy of EM resources of its member states when responding to 
epidemics that transcend international boundaries.  Recommendations of this study 
include, planning for unfamiliar hazards, and the need for ECOWAS to develop a 
memorandum of understanding among EMAs of member states. This research 
provides a blueprint on how EMAs can appropriately respond to unknown epidemics 
in future to save lives in West Africa. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
In 2014, the Ebola epidemic ravaged West Africa. The situation devastated the 
social cohesion of the most impacted countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. 
Although the West African outbreak of 2014 was not the first Ebola outbreak in the 
world, the magnitude of this outbreak exposed the lack of national and regional 
response to epidemics of such magnitude. The roles that were played or should have 
been played by mandated nonmedical emergency management agencies (EMAs) in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as similar agencies in West Africa need to be 
highlighted to prepare such agencies to respond to epidemics that transcend national 
boundaries. This study therefore explored the key roles that were played or should 
have been played by EMAs. 
This chapter highlights the background of the study, which leads to the 
problem statement, purpose of the study, and research questions. The chapter also 
highlights the theoretical framework and nature of the study. It further defines 
operational terminologies and assumptions as well as the scope, limitations, and 
significance of the study. 
Background of the Study 
The Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak which adversely affected the Manor 
River Region of West Africa in 2014 was the deadliest ever recorded in human 
history. The 2014 outbreak that started in Guinea in December 2013 became the 
deadliest since the virus was first discovered in 1976.  By 23 October 2014, about 
10,129 cases had been reported globally, with Liberia suffering 2,705 deaths (Ryan, 
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2014).  According to Hsu et al. (2018), 21 months after the first confirmed case, 
which was recorded on 23 March 2014, the virus killed 11,315 people across six 
countries: Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, the USA, and Mali. 
The epidemic significantly stalled all socioeconomic activities in Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone.  According to the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Group West for and Central Africa (2015), the EVD pandemic which hit “Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone is the longest, largest, deadliest, and the most complex and 
challenging Ebola outbreak in history” (p. 1). The 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic was the 
largest outbreak in history as 28,646 suspected, probable, and confirmed cases were 
reported with 11,323 deaths by March 30, 2016 (Hsu et al., 2018). Guinea, Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone had weak health infrastructure due to long histories of colonialism 
and civil conflicts (Giugale, 2017; Keirns, 2015; Streifel, 2015). This subsequently 
contributed to the significant impact the crisis had on nationals in the affected 
countries. 
The pandemic had a considerable impact on the socioeconomic development 
of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. The World Bank in 2014 estimated that the total 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) loss of Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone combined 
was about $2.2 billion.  Prior to the epidemic, the World Bank had estimated a 2015 
economic growth rates of 6.8%, 8.9%, and 4.3% for Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Guinea respectively. However, at the peak of the epidemic, the World Bank (2014) 
said, estimated growth for the three countries had reduced to 3.0%for Liberia, -2.0% 
for Sierra Leone, and -0.2% for Guinea. According to  a 2014 report of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), prior to the Ebola outbreak, Sierra Leone’s 
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economy was buoyant and one of the fastest growing economies with a 11.3% 
targeted growth rate for 2014. The IMF report also stated that the Government of 
Sierra Leone had a long-term plan of attaining a middle-income status by 2035 and 
possibly bringing this date forward before the Ebola crisis began. 
From the onset of the epidemic, the responsibility of managing the crisis was 
left to respective governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). However, 
as the pandemic increased in pace, it became clear that the disease did not only pose a 
threat to West Africa but also globally.  The rapid increase of the infections of the 
diseases therefore triggered a global response led by the United Nations (UN) 
(Laverack & Manoncourt, 2015). 
The 2014 Ebola epidemic that ravaged the Manor River area of West Africa 
was the worst of its kind. Significantly, Ebola outbreak of such magnitude had never 
been witnessed around the world, and as a result, all actors at national, regional and 
the international community, were found wanting as the crisis escalated (Rothe et al., 
2015). According to the World Council of Churches, World Vision and the World 
Health Organization (WHO), as referenced by Greyling et. al., (2017), various 
stakeholders such as governments, international organizations civil society and the 
faith sector, were all ill prepared for the scale and complication of the Ebola pandemic 
and consequently delayed the needed response   
In spite of the critical roles that were played by nonmedical EMAs in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone during the crisis, available literature does not explain the significant 
roles that such agencies played or should have played in responding to the Ebola 
crisis. Further, available studies on the Ebola crisis do not explain the functions that 
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were played or should have been played by EMAs at the regional level in West 
Africa. 
Background History of Liberia and Sierra Leone 
Brief History of Liberia 
Liberia had early contacts with Europeans in 1461 when the Portuguese 
named the area the Grain Coast due to its abundance of grains (US, Department of 
State, 2008). The British later established a trading post in the Grain Coast in 1663, 
but the Portuguese destroyed the posts in 1664.  This marked the last contact with 
Europeans and the Western World in Liberia until freed slaves arrived on the coast in 
the early 1880s. These freed African American slaves were later known as Americo-
Liberians and established the capital city and named it Monrovia in 1820 after United 
States President James Monroe founded the country.  The country declared its 
independence on 26 July 1847.  Although Liberia traces its origins to US 
colonization, Liberia was neither a formal colony nor territory of the USA. However, 
the USA regards Liberia as an area of special interest (Whyte, 2016). 
In the formative years of the country, the Americo-Liberians sometimes had 
stiff and violent disapproval from the native people who felt they had been left out of 
citizenship until 1904. Significantly, the style of governance in Liberia was fashioned 
along similar lines as the United States. The political rulership was mainly in the 
hands of the Americo-Liberians, who were about 5% of the population. The political 
rights of the Indigenes had been circumscribed by the powerful Americo-Liberians.  
The Americo-Liberian political elites under the True Whig Party dominated political 
power from independence until 1980, when private and noncommissioned officers 
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from the dispossessed majority staged a coup d’état under the leadership of Master 
Sergeant Kanyon Doe (Yekutiel, 2013). The 1980 coup d’état effectively ended the 
over 133-year monopoly of political power by the Americo-Liberians and ushered in 
the People’s Redemption Council (PRC).  The coupists publicly executed the deposed 
President William Tolbert and several other members of his regime who were mostly 
Americo- Liberians.  
On December 24, 1989, a small group of insurgents under the leadership of 
Doe’s previous procurement chief, Charles Taylor, entered Liberia from Cote d’Ivoire 
(US Department of State, 2008). This insurgency later led to the killing of President 
Samuel Kanyon Doe. On September 9, 1990, Doe was brutally murdered by Prince 
Johnson, a former ally of Charles Taylor who had broken away from Taylor’s New 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and formed an Independent NPFL. After over 6 
years of fighting, the war claimed at least 150,000 lives and displaced almost half of 
the population (Peterson, 1996). The Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) intervened with the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a 
multinational armed force and installed an Interim Government of National Unity in 
October 1990 under the leadership of Dr. Amos Sawyer  (US, Department of State, 
2008). In July 1997, after hurried disarmament and demobilization of the warring 
factions, general elections were held, and Charles Taylor emerged victorious.  Later in 
2003, because of Taylor’s misrule, former adversaries of Taylor started another war, 
which eventually led to the resignation and exile of Taylor to Nigeria. ECOWAS 
again intervened and sent 3600 peacekeepers under the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia 
(ECOMIL). 
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Warring factions, political parties, and civil society later agreed and signed a 
comprehensive peace agreement that laid the framework for a 2-year National 
Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) under the leadership of Gyude Bryant.  
Later in October 2003, by Security Council Resolution 1509, The UN established the 
United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and assumed security 
responsibility of Liberia after a comprehensive peace agreement was signed by the 
feuding factions. UNMIL facilitated the peace and stability of the country, which saw 
the election of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first female president in Africa.  In 
2014, the country was devastated by the Ebola epidemic which killed 11,323 people 
around the globe by March 30, 2016 (Hsu et al., 2018). After President Sirleaf served 
two 6-year successful terms in office, Liberians went to the polls and elected 
President George Weah, who was sworn into office on January 22, 2018. 
History of Sierra Leone 
According to African International Mission Services (AIMS, n.d.), Sierra 
Leone has been populated for 2.5 millennia by different groups of people from 
various parts of Africa. The British in the 17th century set up a trading post near Sierra 
Leone, first to trade in lumber and ivory, but later expanded into slave trade. A colony 
was later established, and in 1787, after the American Revolution, Sierra Leone 
became a destination for relocating black loyalists who had earlier been settled in 
Nova Scotia, When the slave trade was abolished, the British sent many Africans who 
had been liberated from the illegal slave trade to Freetown. Later, 1,200 Black Nova 
Scotians who had earlier escaped slavery in the United States joined (A.IMS, n.d.) 
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On April 27, 1961, under the leadership of Sir Milton Margai, Sierra Leone 
became independent from the United Kingdom, and Margai became the country’s 
first Prime Minister.  Later in 1962, under the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), 
Margai won a landslide victory in the country's elections. After his death, his brother, 
Sir Albert Margai assumed power as Prime Minister in 1964 and later attempted to 
establish a one-party state but was resisted by the opposition All People’s Congress 
(APC). In another general election in 1967, the APC candidate Siaka Stevens 
emerged victorious as the Prime Minister. However, soon after taking office, he was 
removed in a coup d’état led by Brigadier David Lansana. In April 1968, Brigadier 
Lansana’s National Redemption Council (NRC) was toppled by a group of soldiers 
referred to as the Anticorruption Revolutionary Movement (ACRM) led by Brigadier 
John Amadu Bangura in another coup d’état. The ACRM jailed several members of 
the NRC, reestablished the Constitution, and restored Siaka Stevens as the country’s 
Prime Minister. 
On April 19, 1971, Sierra Leone was declared a republic by its Parliament, 
and Siaka Stevens was made the first president of the country and served two terms. 
In 1978, the country’s parliament approved a new constitution, which made the 
country a one-party state, and the APC, the only legitimate political party in the 
country. After Siaka Steven’s retirement in 1985, the APC named General Joseph 
Saidu Momoh as a new presidential candidate, who won in a one-party referendum on 
November 28, 1985 to become the president.  
In the early 1990s, a rebel group under Corporal Foday Sankoh’s 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) waged a rebellion on the Government of Sierra 
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Leone from the East along the country’s borders with Liberia in a war that lasted 11 
years. According to Binningsbø and Dupuy (2009), when the war ended in 2002, 
between 30,000 and 75,000 people had died, and several other thousands had suffered 
atrocities such as gang rape, sexual servitude, and mutilations. Although crimes were 
carried out by both sides, the RUF was noted for amputating limbs of their victims.   
In 1991, ECOMOG intervened and tried to support Sierra Leone’s army to 
fight the rebellion. However, in 1992, a group of young military officers under the 
leadership of Captain Valentine Strasser overthrew President Momoh’s government 
amid the rebellion. The junta established the National Provisional Ruling Council 
(NPRC) that ruled until 1996. Although Captain Strasser assured to hand over power 
to a constitutionally elected government in 1996, he was overthrown by his second-in-
command, Julius Maada Bio, in a bloodless coup in January 1996.   
Bio voluntarily gave up power to Ahmed Tijan Kabbah on March 29, 1996, 
after the latter had won a democratic election. On 25 May 1997, Kabbah’s SLPP 
government was toppled by a group of soldiers who had formed the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) under the leadership of Johnny Paul Koroma. The 
AFRC teamed up with the RUF and ruled the country until February 13, 1998 when 
in response to President Koroma’s request to the UN and ECOWAS to intervene. 
ECOMOG troops stormed Freetown, ousted the junta, and reinstated him. President 
Kabbah again overwhelmingly won a general election in 2002 and served a second 5-
year term in office until 2007 when he handed over power to Ernest Bai Koroma of 
the opposition APC who won subsequent elections.  
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President Koroma led the country for a decade after winning a second 5-year 
term in office and handed over power to Maada Bio on 4 April 2018 after the latter 
won the presidential election. Significantly, Bai Koroma’s tenure witnessed two of the 
country’s worst disasters: the mudslide of August 2017, which killed more than 1000 
people and the Ebola epidemic between 2014 and 2016. 
Problem Statement 
The significantly impacted countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea 
were totally devastated by the EVD, leading to the death of several thousands of 
people. According to Sy and Copley (2015), by March 2015, within a year after the 
outbreak was declared, the EVD in West Africa had killed more than six times the 
collective total deaths (1,560) from all previous Ebola epidemics in Africa. The EVD 
did not only negatively impact the affected countries socioeconomically, but also 
posed a threat to regional and global security (Bappah, 2015; Nakamura, 2014).  As a 
result of the devastating nature of the virus, President Obama, in his address at the 
United Nations in September 2014 indicated that the Ebola epidemic had “become 
more than a health crisis,” and was a “growing threat to regional and global security” 
(Zavis & Hennessey, 2014, para 2).    
At the peak of the epidemic in West Africa, social services in the affected 
countries collapsed.  The seriousness of the Ebola outbreak required the need for 
improved emergency management (EM) systems and effective disaster response in 
the concerned countries in particular and West Africa as a whole (Morton Hamer et 
al., 2017). Although during emergencies of such magnitude, the appropriate 
emergency management agencies of the affected countries are required to take a lead 
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role in managing the crisis, such roles which were played or should have been played 
by the non-medical EMAs of Liberia and Sierra Leone remain unknown. 
Additionally, available literature on the Ebola crisis of 2014 does not highlight the 
roles played by nonmedical EMAs in West Africa when responding to the crisis.  The 
study focused on this lack of information by describing the specific roles played or 
should have been played by EMAs at the national and regional levels in dealing with 
the 2014 Ebola epidemic in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
Purpose of the Study  
The purpose of this generic qualitative study was to learn about the roles 
played by mandated nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone, at the national 
level as well as similar agencies in West Africa in terms of managing the Ebola 
epidemic of 2014. The researcher also highlighted the lessons that can be drawn from 
nonmedical EM response to the Ebola crisis. This study was grounded in the 
pragmatist and advocacy view, which according to Creswell (2014) means that 
research inquiry needs to be interwoven with politics and public agenda. Creswell 
(2014) further explained that pragmatism as a worldview arises out of actions, 
situations, and consequences.  
The 2014 Ebola crisis offers a good opportunity for EM experts to learn about 
how to better handle similar crises elsewhere in future. Significantly, as the Ebola 
crisis of 2014 increased in pace and it became more evident that it posed a significant 
threat to global peace and security, a response from the UN was triggered (Laverack 
& Manoncourt, 2015). However, not much is known about the roles nonmedical 
EMAs of Liberia and Sierra Leone played in responding to the crisis. This research 
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therefore described any roles that were played or should have been played by these 
EMAs. 
 The study relied on primary data gathered from interviews with EM experts 
from institutions in Liberia and Sierra Leone who played critical roles during the 
response to the crisis. Data were also collected through interviews with selected 
individuals from the National Emergency Management Organization (NADMO) of 
Ghana as well as a subject matter expert from the Kofi Anan International 
Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC). The goal of the study was to add 
knowledge regarding how EMAs of countries should respond to national epidemics as 
well as how such agencies should manage epidemics that concurrently afflict 
numerous countries.  
Research Questions 
The researcher used the research questions for this study to fill a gap in 
existing literature regarding EM. The research questions focused on the roles that 
were played or should have been played by nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, as well as similar agencies in West Africa when responding to the 2014 Ebola 
crisis. The research questions were: 
RQ1: What roles did nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone play 
when responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis?  
RQ2: What roles should nonmedical EMAs of Liberia and Sierra Leone and 
similar agencies in West Africa have played when responding to the 2014 Ebola 
crisis? 
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Theoretical Framework 
According to Ravitch and Carl (2016), the theoretical framework comprises of 
a combination of a set of established theories about ways of framing the core 
constructs embodied in a research question (Kindle Locations 1426-1427).  In the 
view of Vinz (2015), the theoretical framework further provides scientific validation 
for research as it shows that the study is based on scientific theory. This study was 
grounded in the functionalist theory, which is based mainly on the works of Herbert 
Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton. The theory holds that 
“society is a system of interconnected parts that work together in harmony to maintain 
a state of balance and social equilibrium for the whole” (Mooney et al., 2007, p. 1). 
The functionalist theory places emphasis on the fact that society is made of parts 
which are interconnected. The theory highlights that each part impacts others and is 
also influenced by other parts. It is important to recognize that in EM, different 
agencies and organizations play different roles when dealing with a crisis.  It is also 
worthwhile to understand the usefulness of the important roles played by each 
stakeholder, to be able to effectively manage epidemics such as Ebola in future. 
Nature of the Study 
The study was a generic qualitative inquiry with a focus on pragmatic 
descriptive method. There are different approaches in a qualitative study, which 
include phenomenology, grounded theory, or ethnography as well as generic 
qualitative inquiry (Lambert & Lambert, 2012; Percy et al., 2015; Kennedy, 2016). 
Percy et al. (2015), elucidated that generic qualitative inquiry examines people's 
accounts of their subjective opinions, outlooks, opinions, or reflections on their 
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experiences, of things in the outer world.  A generic qualitative inquiry according to 
Caelli, as referenced by Cooper and Endacott(2007), attempts to find and understand 
a phenomenon, a process, or the outlook and worldviews of the people involved.  
Selecting a particular research approach should not only be informed by the 
worldview assumptions of the researcher and process of enquiry, neither should it be 
just by preference of the researcher, but should rather be determined mainly by the 
research questions (Creswell 2014, Marshal 1996). The researcher believed that in 
doing research, emphasis needed not to be placed on the method but rather the 
problem. The focus of the researcher was to use any possible means to gather data and 
analyze them to answer the research questions.  
In this generic qualitative inquiry study, the researcher used the purposeful 
sampling method and identified EM experts from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana, 
and collected data through interviews with respondents. Although the study focused 
on Liberia and Sierra Leone, the collection of data from respondents in Ghana 
highlighted the perspective of EM response to the Ebola epidemic from the broader 
West Africa perspective.  All data were transcribed, coded, and converted to 
categories and themes. The inductive thematic analysis approach was used to analyze 
all data to arrive at findings and conclusions.  
Operational Definitions 
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD): According to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), (2017), EVD is an unusual and lethal disease which usually affect 
humans and nonhuman primates.  EVD is caused by an infection of one of the five 
known Ebola virus species. These species include Ebola virus Zaire, Ebola virus 
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Sudan, Taï Forest virus (Côte d’Ivoire), Bundibugyo virus, and Reston virus (Reston 
ebolavirus), which is known only to affect nonhuman primates and pigs . According 
to the Public Health Agency of Canada (2014), a person is said to be infected with 
EVD if he or she presents a fever of more than 38 degrees Celsius and exhibits at least 
one other symptom such as malaise, myalgia, and severe headache. Other symptoms 
include conjunctival injection, pharyngitis, severe abdominal pain, vomiting, bloody 
diarrhea, bleeding not associated with injury, and unexplained hemorrhage.  
Emergency Management (EM): According to Sylves (2015), EM is primarily 
the organization and management of the resources of communities or countries to 
reduce risks relating to severe events that have catastrophic consequences. Efforts are 
usually made for the reduction of losses and costs through the execution of strategies 
that encompasses the entire cycle of disasters such as preparedness, response, 
recovery and mitigation. In the context of this study, the definition of emergency 
management includes the non-medical aspect of dealing with risk and the avoidance 
and prevention of risks associated with the Ebola Virus Disease. 
Epidemic/Pandemic:The rapid spread of highly infectious or contagious 
diseases to several people within given population in a very short period of time. 
Assumption 
Interview responses involved opinions and personal professional experiences 
of respondents in terms of managing disasters. Although such opinions may not be 
verified as factual and true and could affect the authenticity of the research findings, 
the researcher assumed that such responses were accurate and subjected them to 
analysis to arrive at conclusions and recommendations. 
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Scope and Delimitations 
This research only sought to describe and document the roles that were played 
or should have been played by mandated nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone during the 2014 Ebola crisis with the view to enriching EM policymaking. The 
study did not cover activities, functions, and responsibilities of EMAs in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone in terms of managing other natural or humanmade disasters. The study 
did not also explain the roles of other nonmedical stakeholders such as international 
NGOs and other actors who may have played significant roles during the 2014 Ebola 
crisis.  
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea were the countries that were significantly 
impacted by the EVD in 2014. To explain the work of nonmedical EMAs in affected 
countries, it would have been prudent to consider the three most impacted nations. 
However, due to the researcher’s limitation in terms of speaking French, the study 
only focused on Sierra Leone and Liberia and did not include Guinea. In addition to 
data that was collected from Liberia and Sierra Leone, the researcher also collected 
data from EM experts in Ghana to give a broader West African  perspective of EM 
response to the Ebola epidemic. 
Limitations 
One of the key limitations of this study is the fact that the responses from 
participants were based on the subjective professional experience from the limited 
roles they played during the Ebola crisis. The responses from participants were 
therefore, quite subjective and may not represent the actual state of affairs as far as 
leadership and decision making in the respective EMAs were concerned. 
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Additionally, although the researcher identified and contacted 19 EM experts, only 12 
of them agreed to participate in the study. Therefore, the findings of this research may 
not reflect the views of all EM experts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana. Further, 
no data was collected from other stake holders nor ECOWAS. Therefore, there were 
no corroborative views or counter views from persons outside EMAs in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Ghana.  
Significance of the Study 
The study explains how nonmedical EMAs should have managed the Ebola 
crisis in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  The research revealed how the mandated EMAs in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone could apply the essential skills of EM to combat national 
and universal epidemics of disastrous magnitudes in the future.  The research will also 
be useful for nonmedical EMAs in many countries who may be confronted with 
managing future epidemics not only in their respective countries but also contributing 
towards a regional and global response to epidemics. This research may positively 
impact social change through the development of a blueprint on how EMAs can 
appropriately respond to unknown epidemics to save lives in West Africa in future. 
Summary 
This chapter highlights historical information about Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
The goal for this study was to explore the roles that were played or should have been 
played by mandated EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the Ebola outbreak of 
2014, which devastated these countries. Available literature which is reviewed in 
Chapter 2 shows a gap in this area of study. The study therefore employed a generic 
qualitative inquiry methodology with a focus on the pragmatic descriptive method to 
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investigate the possible roles that were played or should have been played by EMAs 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as such similar agencies in West Africa in 
responding the 2014 epidemic. This enabled the researcher to determine the key roles 
to be played by EMAs in managing epidemics that transcend the boundaries of 
countries. 
Chapter 2 highlights scholarly information about the Ebola crisis of 2014. The 
methodology used in this study is outlined in Chapter 3. The researcher discusses data 
collection, analysis and results in Chapter 4, and draws conclusions and makes 
recommendations in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
Introduction 
This qualitative research aimed to describe the roles played by nonmedical 
EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as similar agencies in West Africa when 
responding to the Ebola epidemic of 2014. The study suggests roles that should have 
been played by EMAs before, during, and after the Ebola crisis. This chapter involves 
studies regarding the Ebola epidemic and EMAs. In this chapter, the researcher 
highlights strategies used for the search through available literature and the theoretical 
framework . During the review of available literature, the researcher realized that 
there was no available information on how EMAs responded to the 2014 Ebola crisis. 
 Themes include the history of the Ebola epidemic, sociopolitical factors that 
led to the rapid spread of the disease, the failure of systems in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone which contributed to the spread of the virus, and the effect of the Ebola 
epidemic on socioeconomic development of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Other themes 
discussed in this chapter include international panic and stigmatization of Africans, 
weaponization and bioterrorism of Ebola virus, the national response of Liberia and 
Sierra Leone to the crisis, the response of the international community to the crisis, 
and the involvement of the militaries of Great Britain and the United States of 
America who responded to the epidemic. 
Strategy for Search of Literature 
The researcher used multiple databases to identify peer-reviewed literature on 
the subject mainly from the Walden library, google scholar as well as open source 
information. Books and articles were also retrieved from databases including EBSCO, 
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Jstor, Project muse, Arts and humanities, Political science, Research library social 
science, ProQuest, Pdfdrive.net, Gutenberg.org, and Archive.org. The researcher used 
keyword such as, Ebola, emergency, disaster, management, response, planning, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, to search through the databases. The researcher combined and 
paired the words differently to search through all the databases. All the literature 
found from the search were within a five-year range between 2014 and 2019. 
Theoretical Framework 
This study was guided by the functionalist theory. The functionalist theory is 
based mainly on the works of Emile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton. 
The theory holds that “society is a system of interconnected parts that work together 
in harmony to maintain a state of balance and social equilibrium for the whole” 
(Mooney et al., 2007, p. 1). The theory emphasizes the importance of allowing each 
component of society to play its function to support other components to eventually 
complement the effective functioning of the whole society. According to Fletcher 
(1956), Durkheim's work was mainly based on what he referred to as "social facts" 
which meant values, cultural norms, and social structures that exist outside of the 
individual but have influence  on the individual.  Fletcher (1956) further highlighted 
that in Durkheim’s work titled  “The Rules of Sociological Method,” Durkheim 
surmised that to get a deeper understanding of social facts the historical antecedents, 
and an analysis of the functions of these social facts regarding the social ends they 
serve, are crucial. 
According to Trueman (2018), Parsons viewed society as a system that has 
four basic functional rudiments namely, adaptation, goal attainment, integration and 
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pattern maintenance. Trueman (2018), highlighted that from the perspective of the 
Parsons theory of functionalism, all parts of society can be primarily understood by 
considering the roles they perform in a society.   
Within the functionalist theory, the diverse parts of society are principally 
composed of social institutions, each of which is meant to fill various needs. Each of 
the institutions has specific roles in forming and shaping society (Crossman, 2018). 
The functionalist theory of society is usually likened to the human body where the 
entire body represents the entire society, and the parts in society represent the various 
body parts of the human body.  The parts of the human body complement each other 
to facilitate the proper functioning of the entire body.  Similarly, when the various 
components of society play their ascribed roles, they complement each other for the 
society to run efficiently (Fletcher 1956).   
It is important however to underscore that the functionalist theory has been 
criticized by several scholars.  Despite Durkheim's clarity that the historical 
antecedents and functions of social facts complement each other, some scholars have 
criticized the theory emphasizing on the functional elements of the theory and 
neglecting the historical perspective (Fletcher 1956).  Among the criticisms of the 
functionalist theory is that factionalism risks being misled by their theoretical 
assumptions to misjudge the degree of functional unity in a social structure (Fletcher 
1956). It is imperative to note that it cannot be correct to assume that all social 
grouping such as political parties, trade union groups, governments, other interest 
groups, etc. all work for the collective good and harmoniously in a society (Fletcher 
1956 p. 38).  Another significant criticism of the functionalist theory is the 
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implications the theory has on policymaking. The theory seeks to advocate that 
established institutions are indispensable and inviolable just because they are in 
existence (Fletcher 1956). According to Crossman (2018) critics, such as Antonio 
Gramsci, have argued that the functionalist theory validates the status quo and is 
maintained by the course of cultural hegemony. The theory further discourages people 
from taking active roles in social change even when such changes in society may 
benefit them. 
 In spite of the cogent criticisms leveled against the functionalist theory, the 
researcher considered that it is the appropriate theoretical approach for this study. The 
researcher considered all other stakeholders in EM such as INGOs, military, medical 
establishments, non-medical emergency management agencies, relevant government 
ministries, and agencies, among others as being part of the collective whole. The 
researcher, however, drew a distinction among roles of various stakeholders and 
highlighted the specific roles that the nonmedical EMAs played or should have played 
to complement the collective whole, in managing the Ebola epidemic.  
History of the Ebola Epidemic 
According to Simon (2014), The first recording of Ebola outbreak was on 27 
June 1976 in Nasara, Sudan, where after 5 days of exhibiting symptoms of diarrhea, 
vomiting, and high body temperature the virus claimed the life of its first ever victim. 
Subsequently, 151 others died out of 288 cases of infections that were reported. 
Simon (2014), said that the Ebola outbreak again occurred within months of the first 
outbreak in Nasara, this time in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo 
[DRC]) with 280 out of 318 infected people in that country losing their lives. 
22 
 
 
 
According to the WHO (2018), however, there were simultaneous outbreaks in 
Nasara (South Sudan) and Yambuku (DRC Congo) in 1976 near the Ebola River, 
from where the virus derived its name. Subsequently, as of 2016, the Ebola virus had 
killed nearly 41% (9,604 out of 23,729) of people infected internationally (Maras & 
Miranda, 2016). In spite of the fact that the first Ebola outbreak was recorded in 1976, 
the Ebola virus only became extensively known  in the early 1990s (Fidler, 2015). 
The scale of the EVD epidemic that occurred in West Africa in 2013–2015 
was unparalleled in human history.  According to Oleribe et al., (2015), before the 
2013-14 outbreak in West Africa, there had been about 23 other outbreaks mainly in 
East and Central Africa, with about 2,500 cases. The countries that had suffered 
outbreaks included the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Gabon, Ivory Coast, 
Uganda and Congo-Brazzaville. Before the West Africa outbreak, the largest EVD 
epidemic occurred in 2000 in Uganda with a total of 425 reported cases out of which 
224 people died, representing 53% fatality (Cenciarelli et al., 2015a; Kinsman, 2012). 
Since the first case of Ebola was reported in 1976, and before the 2013 outbreak in 
West Africa, 1,527 victims out of the 2,306 reported cases had died, representing 66% 
fatality rate (Kinsman, 2012).  
The 2013 outbreak was the first of its kind in West Africa (Kissi 2014).  The 
disease broke out in December 2013, in a small village in Guinea (Hood, 2015). 
According to Yan and Smith (2015), the first infection in the 2013 outbreak can be 
traced to an unknown two-year-old toddler, Emile, now referred to as patient zero, 
who contracted the disease in December 2013 exhibiting fever, black stool, and 
vomiting, and died four days after on December 6. Within a month, his young sister, 
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mother, and grandmother also died with similar symptoms. In the next couple of 
months, the disease spread to the other parts of the country, and within months the 
virus had jumped the border into Liberia and later spread into Sierra Leone (Hood, 
2015; McInnes, 2015).  On August 8, 2014, as a result of the severity of the epidemic 
in West Africa, the WHO declared the situation a Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern (PHEIC) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2017a). 
As at March 29, 2016, when WHO lifted the PHEIC status, a total of 3,814 suspected 
probable or confirmed cases had been reported in Guinea with 2,544 deaths. (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 2017a),  
The Ebola disease was first reported in Liberia in the Lofa County in March 
2014 by the Ministry of Health. (Lindblade et al., 2015; Bowles et al., 2016, p. 271). 
In spite of early calls for a national and international response, the spread of the 
disease overtook the capabilities of authorities and spread very fast to other parts of 
the country (Bowles et al., 2016). The virus quickly spread to Monrovia, the capital 
city by the end of May, and by August, 10 out of the 15 counties of the country had 
been infected by the virus and by December 2014, several outbreaks were detected in 
remote rural areas of the country (Lindblade et al., 2015). According to the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (2017 a), Liberia was initially declared free from 
Ebola in May 2014. However, other cases were later seen and treated, with the 
country being redeclared free from Ebola in September 2015. After that, additional 
cases were found and dealt with until January 14, 2016, when the country announced 
that it was Ebola-free with no additional cases being found. The disease was later 
spread to other countries such as Nigeria and the United States. At the end of the 
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crisis, Liberia recorded a total of 10, 678 suspected, probable or confirmed cases with 
4,810 deaths. 
In Sierra Leone, the virus was probably first brought to the country in May 
2014 when people returned from Guinea after the funeral of a traditional healer who 
got infected and died trying to cure victims of Ebola in Guinea.  According to a WHO 
(2018), report however, investigations later revealed that the country's first case was a 
female who was a guest at the home of an Ebola victim in Guinea. When her hosts 
fell sick, she returned to Sierra Leone and died there soon after. However, her death 
was neither investigated nor reported on time. The disease quickly spread through the 
country and by July 2014 cases had been reported in Freetown, the capital and many 
other parts of the country. As at December 31, 2014, a total of 9446 confirmed cases 
were reported, including 2758 deaths in Sierra Leone (Cenciarelli et al., 2015a). By 
March 29, 2016, when WHO lifted the PHEIC status, Sierra Leone had recorded 
14,124 suspected, probable or confirmed cases with 3,956 fatalities (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention 2017a). 
In addition to the profoundly hit countries of Liberia Guinea and Sierra Leone, 
other countries in West Africa such as Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali, had infections but 
were rapidly dealt with. According to Oleribe et al. (2015), the first case of Ebola 
entered Nigeria on 20 July 2014, when a Liberian diplomat, Patrick Sawyer, traveled 
to Nigeria. After suspicion on ten diagnoses on 23 July, Sawyer was confirmed 
positive to the Ebola virus on 25 July, the day he died. The disease eventually spread 
to the southern city of Port Harcourt, through an individual who was under 
surveillance and had traveled to the city to get secret treatment. Unlike Liberia, 
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Guinea, and Sierra Leone, Nigeria managed to contain the situation, and as at the time 
WHO lifted the PHEIC status, Nigeria had a total of 20 suspected, probable or 
confirmed cases with eight fatalities (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
2017 a).  
The only case of Ebola reported case in Senegal occurred when a student from 
Guinea-Conakry traveled to Senegal. When he was seen to exhibit symptoms such as 
diarrhea and fever, he was treated for malaria and later sent to the University Hospital 
in Dakar on 29 August 2014, where he was diagnosed as Ebola patient and treated 
(Oleribe et al., 2015, p). In Mali, eight suspected, probable or confirmed cases were 
reported with six fatalities. It is important to underscore that countries such as Italy, 
United Kingdom, and Spain had a case each of Ebola infection but was all treated 
with no deaths. The United States, however, had four confirmed cases with one 
fatality. The victim had traveled to the United States from Liberia to the United 
States. He was isolated for treatment but later died.  
Although non-medical emergency management agencies have important roles 
to play in the management of epidemics, it is noteworthy to underscore that in all the 
known outbreaks, the role of such non-medical emergency management agencies has 
not been highlighted in all the available literature. 
Sociopolitical Factors Leading to Rapid Spread of the Virus 
During the 2014 epidemic, between December 2013 when the virus claimed 
its first victim in October 2014, the disease had killed 4,951 people and infected 13, 
567 others, “crippling families, health systems, incomes, food supply and economies” 
of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in its wake (Wilkinson & Leach 2015, p. 136). 
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By the beginning of 2014, the infection rate was rising exponentially as the number of 
infections doubled every 20 to 30 days (Hood, 2015). Several reasons account for the 
rapid spread of the Ebola Virus from the beginning of the first recorded casualty in 
Guinea and its subsequent spread to Liberia and Sierra Leone and further to other 
countries. Among the reasons include, cultural practices and poverty, the apathy of 
the Governments of Sierra Leone and Liberia at the onset of the epidemic, poor public 
education, and slow response from the international community, among others. 
High levels of poverty and cultural practices and beliefs contributed 
significantly to the spread of the virus (Forestier et al., 2016). Chan, (2014) observed 
that large numbers of people in the expressively impacted countries of the Ebola 
epidemic do not have stable remunerated employment, a situation which fuels 
population movements across borders in their quest to find work. By this movement 
of people between Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and to other countries outside 
the West African region, infected people "carried the virus along" and infected people 
in other countries. Further, many socio-cultural and customary practices such as 
shaking hands, traditional ways of nursing the sick, initiation rites and burial rituals 
were identified as major causes of the rates of Ebola transmission (Gbla, 2018). 
Bell et al. (2017) argued that the Ebola outbreak rather eroded cultural ties and 
significantly changed the cultural behavior of the people who were significantly 
impacted. Consequent to the Ebola outbreak, people stopped relating normally with 
others in the communities. It is quite customary for Liberians, for instance, to eat 
together, hug each other and shake hands, however, because of the Ebola outbreak, 
these practices had changed. Bell et al. (2017), further highlighted that West Africans 
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often view burials as a celebration of life and are entrenched with rituals such as 
bathing and preparing a dead body. However, because of the Ebola outbreak, there 
has been a significant shift in such cultural and traditional practices. 
According to Forestier et al., (2016), the first casualty of the West African 
Ebola outbreak of 2014 occurred when the victim, an 18-month-old child died on 26 
December 2013, within two days of becoming ill. By the second week of January, 
several members of his family together with many community health workers also 
died . Although these deaths should have immediately alerted officials, it was only on 
24 January 2014 that the first public health alert was issued even though initial 
investigations concluded that the victims had died of cholera. Despite the seriousness 
of the issue, there were no further public health alerts until 1 March 2014. Even after 
the virus had entered, Liberia and Sierra Leone, government officials, were very slow 
in responding to the epidemic, a situation which allowed the virus to gain roots in the 
two countries. 
Also, inadequate and misleading public education significantly contributed to 
the spread of the virus. Among the public education that was churned out was that the 
people should not eat bushmeat, and a consumption ban was subsequently put in place 
in Guinea (Wilkinson & Leach, 2015). This message was misleading to the extent that 
although the Ebola virus was traced to fruit bats, its subsequent spread was mainly 
human to human transmission. (Wilkinson & Leach, 2014). The role of bushmeat had 
erroneously emerged even in the theoretical discourse on Ebola, although, some 
evidence took cognizance of the fact that the Ebola virus was characterized by a 
single zoonotic source, while its subsequent infections were exclusively human to 
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human transmission (Sastry &Dutta 2017).  Another significant factor that contributed 
to the rapid spread of the disease was the fact that rumors circulated that health 
officials were responsible for the spread of the disease and subsequently, some 
communities completely shut themselves off. Patients were even removed from 
treatment facilities, and health centers attacked (Wilkinson & Leach, 2014). 
The slow response of the international community also contributed to the 
containment of the epidemic. At the onset of the Ebola crisis, both national 
governments of the significantly impacted countries and the international community 
were slow in responding, a situation which facilitated the wide spread of the virus 
from Guinea where it first occurred, to neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone. There 
was a lack of coordination between the Ministry of Health in Guinea and the WHO, at 
the onset of the outbreak in Guinea. This situation compounded by the proximity of 
where the outbreak began, and boundaries among Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 
led to an easy spread of the virus to neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone (Wilkinson 
and Leach, 2014). The WHO only announced on its website on 23 March 2014 after 
the virus had infected people in neighboring Libera and Sierra Leone. (Forestier et al., 
2016) 
It is important to note that at the onset of the epidemic if the non- medical 
emergency management agencies in the impacted countries had responded rapidly, 
the outbreak would most probably have been contained to avoid its uncontrolled 
spread and the vast loss of life in the affected countries. However, minimal literature 
exists on the roles played by these agencies. The need for the development of the 
EMAs in these countries can therefore not be overemphasized. 
29 
 
 
 
Systemic Failure Contributing to the Spread of Ebola 
Epidemics, when they strike can be very destructive to society and the health 
infrastructure of countries. According to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (2017b), epidemics could sometimes lead to millions of mortality cases 
and devastate the healthcare systems of the affected country.  In the view of Roemer-
Mahler and Rushton (2016), the outbreak of the EVD that ravaged Liberia, Guinea, 
and Sierra Leone in 2014 was in several ways an exceptional epidemic. The Ebola 
epidemic also revealed the weaknesses in the health delivery system of the affected 
countries. According to Ifediora, and Aning, (2017), the Ebola outbreak did not only 
expose the challenges of national, regional and global bodies but also the weaknesses 
of various institutional frameworks that should have been competent to manage the 
outbreak. Researchers have ascribed several causative factors to the breakdown of the 
health delivery systems in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Anderson & Beresford 2016; 
Bappah, 2015; Moran, 2015; Kissi, 2014). As at the time the Ebola outbreak occurred, 
the public health infrastructure system in all the seriously impacted countries was 
woefully short-staffed and not adequately funded (Comfort et al., 2016).   
The decades of civil wars the broke out in Liberia, and Sierra Leone had a 
grave consequence on social services in the two countries. This negatively impacted 
the healthcare systems in the affected countries to the extent that when the Ebola 
crisis started, the fragile health systems in place could not adequately contain the 
outbreak. For instance, in 2013, Sierra Leone had 0.2 doctors and 1.7 
nurses/midwives per 10,000 population, compared with 7.8 and 49, and 27.9 and 88.3 
in South Africa and the United Kingdom respectively (Fitzgerald et al., 2016).  The 
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state of affairs in healthcare delivery in neighboring Liberia and Guinea were no 
different.  Although a gloomy picture of healthcare delivery has been painted in 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, Comfort et al. (2016) highlighted that between 
2007 and 2011, the Liberian Government had managed to double the number of 
healthcare workers from a low of 3,996 to 8553. The Liberian Government also had 
plans to increase the number to 15000 by 2021 and increase per capita expenditure on 
healthcare from $18 in 2011 to $44 by 2021.  With the population of healthcare 
workers in Liberia and Sierra Leone this low, it is not surprising that the Ebola 
epidemic could not be effectively managed by healthcare workers in the two 
countries, resulting in several deaths before the intervention of other external 
respondents.   
Moran (2015), compared the outbreak and uncontrollable spread of the disease 
in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, to the cases that were reported in Nigeria, 
Senegal, and Mali and argued that Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone which were 
mainly impacted by the crisis had weak health systems because of wars. Nigeria, 
Senegal, and Mali, on the contrary, had good public health systems and as a result, 
were able to better deal with the outbreak. The broken health system in Liberia 
Guinea and Sierra Leone can also be blamed on public policies some of which were 
prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as well as 
international help requirements that removed state financial funding for health 
education (Kisi, 2014).  
It is also instructive to underscore the fact that even before the Ebola outbreak 
in West Africa, several African countries had broken health care systems. This 
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situation, which Kissi (2014), describes as “the criminal neglect of the health 
infrastructure of the affected countries by dictatorial governments and their officials 
who have amassed tremendous wealth” (p. 2). This epic description of the health care 
system in West Africa was a significant cause of the easy spread of the epidemic 
among the three most impacted countries by the Ebola epidemic.   
Additionally, other factors such as the weak and corrupt political system in 
Sierra Leone led to a weak health system in that country that was incapable of 
containing the Ebola pandemic and thereby leading to its spread in Sierra Leone 
(Anderson & Beresford 2016). Anderson and Beresford (2016) highlighted that 
“Since the country’s devastating civil war of (1991–2002, Sierra Leone has become a 
‘laboratory’ for liberal experiments in state building and governance” (p. 469). 
Further, the health sector of Sierra Leone has always been dependent on external aid, 
which has consequently compromised the government’s control over the sector 
(Anderson & Beresford, 2016). 
Davies and Rushton (2016), also raised very critical questions on medical 
assistance to civilians by peacekeeping missions. They indicated that the reliance of 
external partners such as peacekeeping missions to cushion failing national health 
systems in countries such as Liberia was detrimental and one of the main reasons why 
the country was unable to provide a workable national health system. However, the 
crucial issue is, for a country that was coming out of over a decade of civil war, 
external assistance in most spheres of public life including support in the medical 
field was crucial to sustain the fragile structures which remained after the war.  
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Significantly, it is noteworthy that in spite of the crucial roles that non-medical 
emergency management agencies have to play in responding to the crisis, not much is 
known about the capacity of such agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone before, during 
and after the West Africa Ebola crisis of 2013/14.    
Effect of Ebola on Socioeconomic Development of Liberia and Sierra Leone 
  The Ebola outbreak in West Africa was very rare, and almost totally 
overturned developmental efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone after the civil wars that 
ravaged those countries. (Oleribe et al., 2015) The epidemic had a considerably 
negative impact on the socio-economic growth of the affected and negative impact 
development impact was quite colossal. Ryan (2014), asserted that the severity of the 
outbreak significantly disrupted the entire established fabric of Liberia, unsettling not 
only the governance structure of but also the health system.  Before the Ebola crisis, 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone had very good prospects for socio-economic 
accomplishments, bearing in mind their enormous natural wealth and improving 
macroeconomic projections (Sy & Copley, 2015). In Sierra Leone, as a result of the 
Ebola outbreak, both exports and the capacity to generate revenue through taxes were 
severely weakened due to the substantial decrease in economic activities (Dumbuya & 
Nirupama, 2017). 
   According to Bappah (2015), "the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank projected that the immediate fiscal effects of the EVD outbreak were 
US$113 million (5.1 percent of GDP) for Liberia, US$95 million (2.1% of GDP) for 
Sierra Leone, and US$120 million (1.8%) for Guinea" (p. 192).  The consequence of 
the disaster also saw a sharp reduction of GDP growth rate of Liberia from the 
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preliminary 8.7% through 5.9% and 2.5% to 1% (Ryan, 2014).  Revised World Bank 
estimates projected that more than $ 1.6 billion of productivity from the severely 
impacted countries of the Ebola epidemic would be forgone in 2015 (Bowles et al., 
2016).  
Because of the disease, countries which share common borders with the 
infected countries closed their borders and limited movement of persons across 
countries to avert a more spread of the disease (Sy & Copley 2015). The epidemic 
seriously hampered agricultural production, a situation which did not only lead to 
price uncertainties but also stifled sale of agricultural products in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Guinea (Sy& Copley 2015). Public and private limitations on commerce 
and travel did not only jeopardize the already poor economic situation of the infected 
countries but also hindered efforts to control the disease (Moon et al., 2015). 
Eventually, the crisis led to the most noteworthy setback to economic development in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone in more than a decade (Bowles et al., 2016, p. 271).  
Within Liberia, there was a significant reduction in economic activities and 
jobs in entire country during the Ebola crisis, especially in the in Monrovia (Bowles et 
al., 2016). In Monrovia, the construction and restaurant sectors witnessed significant 
cuts in employment. The situation in Sierra Leone was not different as the crisis 
forced several companies to cut down their operations, leaving just skeletal staff or 
temporarily halting their operations to prevent their staff from being infected. This 
state of affairs significantly obstructed revenue and GDP (Dumbuya & Nirupama, 
2016). Consequently, there was a domino effect which impacted the service industry 
such as hospitality and tourism. 
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Additionally, some foreign-owned companies either completely shut down 
their operations or operated at minimum capacity, causing a significant impact on the 
economies of the affected countries.  In Liberia, a Chinese company that was 
undertaking a World Bank contract for the construction of a road that was to facilitate 
trade between Liberia and Guinea, China Henan International Cooperation Group, 
pulled out its workers, leaving the most significant infrastructural project in Liberia to 
be redundant (Taylor, 2015). Similarly, the Chinese Civil Engineering Construction 
Company sent its foremen and critical workers back to China and postponed all local 
projects in Sierra Leone, because of the Ebola outbreak. The China Kingho Energy 
Group also abandoned its premises and pulled out of Sierra Leone (Taylor, 2015) 
According to Wilkinson and Leach (2015), at the peak of the Ebola crisis in 
July 2015, London Mining, a London-based firm withdrew its expatriate staff from 
the country.  Also, British Airways and other airlines stopped all flights to the 
country, a situation which further negatively impacted on trade.  Apart from the 
negative impact of the Ebola crisis on the economic activities of the natives and 
revenue to the Governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone, the epidemic negatively hit 
every sphere of the broader society of Liberia and Sierra Leone. At the peak of the 
crisis, religious and other social activities were halted, schools were closed, and social 
relations among people were significantly impaired.  
It is important to underscore that despite the negative socio-economic impact 
of the Ebola crisis on Liberia and Sierra Leone very little is known about the roles 
non-emergency management agencies such as the Liberia National Disaster 
Management Agency (NDMA) and the Sierra Leone Department of Disaster 
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Management within the Office of National Security (ONS). A crucial question is 
whether an intervention by or inclusion of these non-medical emergency management 
agencies in the two countries would have averted the epidemic and thereby preserving 
the socio-economic gains that had been made by both countries after many years of 
brutal civil wars in those countries. 
International Panic and Stigmatization of Africans 
The Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2013 to 2015 invoked fear and panic 
around the world which led to some governments either contemplating or taking 
drastic measures to prevent a possible outbreak in their respective countries. Although 
Africa is a continent of 54 countries, many Africans were sometimes lumped together 
as coming from one country (Opar 2014). This generalization was done either from 
out of panic and fear of infection or merely out of ignorance. Kissi (2014) highlighted 
that, while some people stereotyped Africa and Africans as the quintessence of 
sickness and argued that Ebola from the "dark Africa" poses a danger to "American 
civilization", others contended that such reactions are reasonable public health 
reactions to a lethal virus. In Kissi’s view such arguments make Ebola, Africa and 
indeed all Africans synonymous. Such situations do not only create unnecessary fear 
and panic around Africans but also reinforces the wrong impression and 
stigmatization of the continent and its people as "backward" and "dangerous."  
According to Monson (2017) Although the first patient of the 2014 Ebola 
crisis was documented in March 2014, the media did not pay attention until late 
summer 2014 when Dr. Kent Brantly, arrived in the United States for treatment after 
contracting the virus. As a result, of Dr. Brantly’s arrival, the US media was saturated 
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with headlines such as "Close to Home: First Case of Ebola Diagnosed in the U.S." 
and "American Nurse with Protective Gear Gets Ebola: How Could This Happen" (p. 
4). While 99% of Ebola infections were in Guinea, Libera and Sierra Leone, a few 
travel related incidents to Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and the United States highlighted the 
potential for the disease to spread by travelers from Africa, a situation which 
dominated American media portrayals of the Ebola virus (Gronke, 2015). 
 Kim, (2014), described how some experts and volunteers who served in Liberia 
during the crisis were stigmatized and subjected to some scientifically indefensible 
quarantine policy in New Jersey and Maine when they returned to the United States.  
Moon et al., (2015), held the view that response to the Ebola infections in the United 
States was characterized by fear and hysteria which later resulted in 
counterproductive measures including quarantines of aid workers who were returning, 
a situation which significantly hindered the control of the epidemic. Several other 
countries, companies, and organizations also imposed travel restrictions on their staff. 
Due to lack of knowledge, several countries tried to use border controls to 
prevent the "importation of the disease" into their respective territories. Gronke 
(2015), summarized some of the countries that took drastic measures to use border 
controls to avoid infections. Indeed, African countries such as Cameroun, Gambia, 
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal stopped, or limited air travels form all 
Ebola-infected countries (Gronke, 2015).  South Africa refused entry to non-citizens, 
and others on permanent residence status traveling from the infected countries 
(Gronke, 2015). Other developed countries such as Australia, provisionally deferred 
immigration and humanitarian programs to West Africans. In Costa Rica, authorities 
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were on high alert because of large numbers of undocumented West Africans who 
were en-route to the United States through the country to the extent that police 
officers were warned not to touch any dead bodies under any situation including road 
traffic accidents and crime scenes devoid of Ebola suspicion (Gronke, 2015). Just on 
Ebola suspicion Albania detained and quarantined illegal Eritrean migrants who had 
arrived there through Greece, with the intention of crossing the Adriatic Sea into Italy.    
Even though the Ebola epidemic significantly affected only three out of 16 
West African countries, to a large extent anyone traveling from any part of Africa to 
other parts of the world was thought to be infected with Ebola virus. Also, because of 
unnecessary fear that had been created, professionals who could go into the infected 
countries to help respond to the crisis were scared to go. Kim (2014), posited that 
even respectable people in society had contributed to the scaremongering and 
advocated for travel bans. 
 It is interesting to note that in spite of all the fear and subsequent 
stigmatization of everyone traveling from Africa to the rest of the world, for fear of 
carrying the virus, Ghana accepted to host the Headquarters of the UN Mission for 
Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) in Accra. This meant that responders had to 
respond to and from Accra, however, not a single case of infection was and has ever 
been reported in Ghana. The fact that there was no Ebola infection reported in Ghana 
despite the movement of people to and from Liberia and Sierra Leone during the 
epidemic, is an indication that many countries were unnecessarily afraid of infections. 
However, what needed to be done was to put in credible measures to prevent possible 
transmission of the virus, rather than stigmatizing travelers from Africa.  
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Weaponization and Bioterrorism of Ebola Virus 
In human history, adversaries in conflicts or wars have always found a way to 
deal lethal blows to their opponents to defeat or annihilate them.  In the early parts of 
the twentieth century, efforts were made by countries to weaponize viral agents 
(Pedersen, 2017). According to Chiodo, as referenced by Pedersen (2017), accounts 
of warfare in the Middle Ages indicate that there was a use of combat weapons such 
as spears and swords which were deliberately infected with bacterial agents. Pedersen 
(2017) referenced Langmuir and Andrews who had stated that during the twentieth 
century, the manufacturing of epidemics advanced to include the delivery of aerosol 
pathogens or the contamination of water and food supplies.  Some scholars have 
indicated that there are legitimate concerns that the Ebola virus could be used by 
extremists in a bioterrorism attack, (Passi et al., 2015; Maras & Miranda, 2016; 
Malizia et al., 2016). 
From the 1980s, extremists have gradually considered biological warfare 
agents as a highly threatening tool for disruption of civil society and world economy 
(Cenciarelli et al., 2015b).  Maras and Miranda (2016), observed that in the 1990s 
Aum Shinrikyo, the leader of a Japanese cult with the name Shoko Asahara, together 
with many doctors moved to the then Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo) under 
the pretext of a medical assignment to study and to obtain samples of the deadly 
Ebola virus. Although the cult was unsuccessful in creating biological weapons, it is 
important to emphasize that the attempt by the group to even get samples of the virus 
to weaponize it for mass destruction is an indication that both state and non-state 
actors to do maximum damage to humanity could still use the virus. 
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Ebola is a dangerous virus that does not only cause an extremely contagious 
infection which is difficult to contain, but it may also be used deliberately to present a 
serious threat as a possible biowarfare agent (Cenciarelli et al., 2015b). During the 
Ebola Crisis in West Africa, the political class in the United States had suggested the 
imposition of travel ban because of the fear that ISIS recruits could infect themselves 
with Ebola to carry out bioterrorism (Kim, 2014).  
Because terrorism is one of the main security threats of the twenty-first 
century, the possibility of non-state actors attempting to weaponize the Ebola virus for 
terrorist acts cannot be overemphasized.  Passi et al. (2015), highlighted how the 
Ebola virus spreads and surmised that due to the potential features of the Ebola virus, 
it is a highly likely agent for bioterrorism. Considering that Ebola may be caused 
naturally, Thiessen (2014), opined that with Ebola, “mother nature has created a 
perfect weapon” (para. 6).  Should Ebola and Islamic radicalism be combined into 
one, the world will become a very dangerous place (Thiessen, 2014).   
In Mcinnes (2016) view, from a traditional national security standpoint, 
attention has rarely been fixated on the likelihood for a health crisis to lead to failure 
of states which has far-reaching consequences for regional stability and international 
security. Mcinnes (2016), further highlighted the possible use of pathogens such as 
smallpox or anthrax as weapons of mass destruction, plus the probable use of 
pathogens for bioterrorism.    
Possible agents of attack are categorized by the dangers they pose, and these 
categories range from A, B and C, with Category A being the most dangerous.  Due to 
its capability to create mass terror and commotion, coupled with the distinct public 
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health activities required to treat infected people, Ebola is categorized as Category A. 
(Pedersen, 2017; Cenciarelli et al., 2015b).  In Pedersen's (2017) view, a genetically 
invented virus can be more disastrous than atomic weapons.  Gunaratne (2015), 
surmised that despite scientific progress in medical virus surveillance if the Ebola 
virus were intentionally introduced into a densely inhabited area, the consequence 
would be catastrophic.  As highlighted by Thiessen (2014), if terrorists collect 
samples of infected body fluids and clandestinely place them at public places on 
doorknobs, handrails etc. the disease will spread silently before authorities realize that 
a biological attack has occurred. Thiessen (2014), further posited that the Ebola virus 
was prevalent on the African continent where terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, 
Ai-Qaeda and Islamic State are active.  Considering the 21-day gestation period of the 
virus, terrorist groups could get more than enough time to infect themselves and 
others before they are detected.  
Cenciarelli et al. (2015), however, hypothesized with two worst-case scenarios 
where Ebola virus can be released, the choice of which would depend on the purpose 
of the terrorist organization. The first scenario included an overt attack, and the 
second, a stealthy attack. Regarding overt attack, Cenciarelli et al. (2015), posited that 
using Ebola virus would be useless, apart from the fear and panic it will cause, since 
such actions and infections would be prompted leading to isolation procedures by the 
authorities. The detection and other procedures might lead to the blocking of the 
spread of the virus and reduction in lethal cases.  About a stealthy attach, Cenciarelli 
et al. (2015), indicated that the strategy of deliberately and covertly infecting people 
without anyone realizing would have a suspended effect through manipulation of the 
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incubation period.  This strategy has the potential to widely spread infections among 
people with serious ramifications of mass murder.   Due to the disastrous 
consequences of the potential use of the Ebola virus as a weapon of mass destruction 
by terrorist groups, the need for non-medical emergency managers to have a 
contingency plan in place to deal with related safety and security issues cannot be 
overemphasized.  
National Response 
When epidemics break out, the timeliness of rapid response is crucial to 
prevent its spread. In the wake of the crisis, the most impacted countries made several 
efforts to contain the situation, albeit such efforts have been criticized as lacking 
efficiency. The Liberia and Sierra Leone, governments’ responses were prompted at 
the peak of the outbreak and subsequently rolled out measures including the 
imposition of state of emergency, and putting large areas under quarantine, to begin to 
tackle the epidemic (Bowles et al., 2016; Wilkinson & Leach 2015). Additionally, the 
respective government of Liberia and Sierra Leone put in other measures to contain 
the epidemics. 
Gbla (2018), emphasized that in Sierra Leone, the government harnessed all 
its resources in an attempt to tackle the Ebola crisis. Operationally, the Government of 
Sierra Leone responded to the crisis by creating and executing various agendas with 
the view to effectively coordinating a response to the crisis. Between July and 
September 2014, the Government of Sierra Leone established an Emergency 
Operations Center (EOC) which was primarily used for the coordination of activities 
(Olushayo et al., 2016). Then, from October 2014 till the end of the crisis in 
42 
 
 
 
November 2015, the Government used a command and control fashioned Incident 
Management System (IMS) referred to as the National Ebola Response Center 
(NERC) to manage the epidemic (Olushayo et al., 2016). The initial national EOC 
had the responsibility of coordinating the operational and technical aspects of the 
response under five technical components, namely; “coordination; 
epidemiology/surveillance/laboratory; case management/infection control; social 
mobilization/psychosocial support; and logistics” (p. 2).   
The EOC was mainly managed under the Ministry of Health and Sanitation 
and was overseen by the Minister for Health or the Chief Medical Officer. The ONS, 
an agency that is mandated to coordinate emergency management in the country and 
most suitable for that role (Gbla, 2018), however, could have better managed this 
oversight and coordination responsibility. As a result of the failure of the EOC, the 
government established the NERC, which was more encompassing and included 
several other actors including the Security Agencies. The Security Agencies such as 
the Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) as well as 
hybrid structures including chiefdom and district security committees, District Ebola 
Response Committees (DERC), etc. joined efforts to manage the epidemic (Gbla, 
2018).   
The NERC was designed with a local government oversight through a chief 
executive officer appointed by the President (Forestier et al., 2016). Unlike many 
other places around the globe such as Nepal in 2015 and Haiti in 2010 where the local 
governments were completely overwhelmed in their effort to coordinate relief and 
response during the disasters in those countries, the case of Sierra Leone was 
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completely different due to the effectiveness of the NERC and DERCs that were set 
up by the Sierra Leone Government (Forestier et al., 2016). The situation room at the 
NERC was replicated at the various DERCs with slight modification, depending on 
the particular requirements of the district (Forestier et al., 2016). At both the NERC 
and DERC levels, the military gave advisors and Chiefs of Staffs to effectively 
coordinate response and assist the chief executive officer (Forestier et al., 2016). 
According to UNICEF as referenced by Thomas et al. (2017), as the epidemic 
escalated and began to spill out of control in Liberia, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf 
declared a state of emergency, shut schools, provisionally laid off less essential 
government employees and closed the country's land borders. Also, the President, 
with the support of the Center for Disease Control, created an Incident Management 
System, under the oversight of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. She further 
created a Presidential Advisory Committee on Ebola under her supervision as the 
highest decision and policymaking body on the Ebola crisis response, with the view to 
ensuring accountability and establishing a clear chain of command (Thomas et al. 
2017),  
Scholars have given how various institutions responded to the Ebola crisis in 
West Africa, and reasons why these responses were effective or otherwise, in 
containing the crisis (Shepler, 2017; Comfort et al., 2016; Olushayo et al., 2016).  In 
all the significantly impacted countries, the responses were ineffective due to factors 
such as the scale of the outbreak, ineffective capacity for response and emergency 
communication, ineffective coordination, poor health systems, and community 
resistance (Olushayo et al., 2016). Liberia and Sierra Leone are among the least 
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ranked countries in the global Human Development Index, ranked 176 and 183 
respectively out of 187 countries, and as such, did not have the required systems in 
place to deal with a mass outbreak of a disease (Wenham, 2016). Given the limited 
resources of the respective Ministries of Health of the significantly impacted 
countries, it was practically impossible for the Ministries to be able to effectively deal 
with the threat of Ebola without assistance from the other actors and the international 
community (Comfort et al., 2016).  
Shepler (2017), ascribed corruption, mismanagement of funds and weakness 
of the State as part of the factors that contributed to the spread of the disease. Shepler, 
(2017), further highlighted that the virus was given a foothold when the Ministries of 
Health of Liberia and Sierra Leone played down the threat at the beginning of the 
crisis.  In Liberia, because of constant accusations of corruption in President Sirleaf's 
government, several Liberians even thought that the Ebola outbreak was a subterfuge 
by corrupt officials to make money (Shepler 2017),  
According to Wilkinson and Leach (2015), the problem of insufficient 
resources in Sierra Leone was compounded by corruption.  It is alleged that high-level 
corruption resulted in donors suspending funds to the Ministry of Health and 
Sanitation in 2013 (Wilkinson & Leach, 2015), Distrust and lack of confidence among 
the citizenry also significantly impacted governments efforts to deal with the 
catastrophe. Also, a rising lack of trust between the public and government officials 
mired communal mobilization and civic education (Moon et al., 2015). In Sierra 
Leone, people peddled rumors and gave various unsubstantiated reasons, targeting 
various groups. Rumors such as US government using Ebola as bio-weapons, 
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pharmaceutical companies testing new vaccines, politicians using Ebola to eliminate 
the populations of the strongholds of their opponents were all peddled (Shepler, 
2017). These made people lose confidence in the Sierra Leone Government’s fight 
against the epidemic.  
Significantly, it is important to underscore that the Governments of both Sierra 
Leone and Liberia put is some measures at the peak of the crisis with the view to 
ensuring an efficient response in their respective countries. However, it is worthy of 
note that the roles of the Disaster Management Department of ONS for Sierra Leone 
and the Liberia NDMA, the agencies which are charged with the primary 
responsibility of coordinating national disaster response in these countries were not 
clearly spelled out in the scheme of the respective Governments’ response efforts to 
the crisis. 
The Response of the International Community 
The Ebola crisis was more complex than a typical health emergency. It was a 
“multi-dimensional public and altruistic crisis which required a complex, multi-
faceted response involving health, aid coordination, personal security, food security, 
appropriate budgetary decision-making, and responsive governance, among others" 
(Ryan, 2014).  Roemer-Mahler and Rushton (2016), contended that in spite of over 
twenty years of significant investment in global health, the comprehensive response to 
the Ebola outbreak in West Africa was sluggish and uncoordinated. Dubois et al. 
(2015), observed that although the warning signs were there, the World Health 
Organization failed to see the impending severity of the epidemic and therefore did 
not respond early enough.  Dubois et al. (2015), further posited that in spite of the 
46 
 
 
 
warnings from agencies on the ground and persistent appeals for action, these calls 
were disregarded. As a result, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) together with less 
experienced agencies and astounded government services were left to address major 
medical issues on their own without the needed support from the international 
community. Dubois et al. (2015), therefore blamed the rapid spread of the disease on 
the failure of both national and international actors to respond quickly to the outbreak.  
Ifediora and Aning (2017), conversely, argued that the remarkable international 
response to the EVD outbreak eventually contributed significantly to the stopping of 
the spread of the disease in West Africa.   
According to Taylor (2015), at the peak of the pandemic, China announced 
that it was sending $5 million worth of medical supplies to the affected countries (p. 
50).  The Ebola situation was the first time China had extended humanitarian support 
to nations ravaged by public health emergency. It is important to underscore that 
while other countries were withdrawing their staff from the impacted countries, China 
sent three teams of infectious diseases experts to the affected countries (Taylor 2015), 
According to OCHA as referenced by Thomas (2016), by the end of 2014, over 62 
countries had promised and dedicated US$2.3 billion to the Ebola response in West 
Africa, including US$806 million specifically for Liberia. The United States 
Government announced a US$319 million response plan; the World Bank announced 
US$105 million in funding for West Africa. The United Nations also outlined nearly 
US$1 billion in funding needs (Thomas, 2016),  
According to Bappah (2015), The Economic Community of West Africa 
States (ECOWAS) played a significant role by mobilizing funds and sending health 
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experts to its member countries that were affected by the Ebola crisis.  However, the 
roles played by other well-endowed organizations such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the United Nations (UN) agencies, largely overshadowed 
the efforts of ECOWAS. 
Regarding the United Nations, in September 2014, the global body declared 
the EVD as a threat to international peace and security. The UN went further to 
establish the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), with the 
objective to stop the outbreak, treat the infected, ensure essential services, preserve 
stability, and prevent further outbreaks (Ifediora & Aning 2017). Davies, and Rushton 
(2016), nevertheless, argued that the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) that 
was already in place before the outbreak of the epidemic could have done more to 
contain the EVD. Davies and Rushton (2016), however, conceded that many factors 
such as the views of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), the competencies of the 
mission as well as actions of the host government among others inhibited the ability 
of UNMIL's contribution.  It is important to point out the fact that UNMIL and many 
other UN Peacekeeping missions have generic responsibility of safeguarding security 
of civilians and humanitarian actors.  However, peacekeeping missions (UNMIL 
included) are usually not necessarily well equipped with skilled personnel and 
resources to deal with a medical epidemic with the magnitude of the Ebola crisis.    
In spite of some of the positive roles played by the international community in 
dealing with the epidemic, scholars believe there are a lot of lessons to be learned 
from the global response if future pandemics are to be managed efficiently (Bappah, 
2015; Ifediora & Aning 2017).  Bappah (2015), argued that some of the mistakes 
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made by ECOWAS included the dependence on weak and poor health institutions in 
the affected countries as well as the failure of the ECOWAS leadership to realize that 
the health personnel in the affected member states were strained and therefore 
required additional hands rather than money.  Further, it was evident that the 
ECOWAS inter-governmental decision-making process was unnecessarily long in 
responding to emergencies. Bappah (2015), however, drew plausible lessons learned 
from the crisis. It was identified that ECOWAS needed to improve on its regional 
emergency response strategy. Bappah (2015), also highlighted the importance of the 
need to accelerate decision making during emergencies and finally suggested the 
reliance on a competent health emergency response mechanism to deal with future 
regional pandemics vibrantly. Ifediora and Aning (2017), were also of the view that 
among other issues, “internationalization of risks and threats will have little effect if 
regional arrangements lack adequate capacity to fulfill their roles within the global 
collective security architecture” (p. 237). 
Involvement of Military from Britain and United States  
United States Troops in Liberia 
At the peak of the crisis, countries such as the United States and Britain supported the 
response effort with military contingents in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively 
(Smernoff, 2013; Anderson & Beresford, 2016; Thomas et al., 2017). According to 
the White House Press Secretary, as referenced by Thomas et al. (2016), as the crisis 
continued to raise significant security concerns in West Africa, President Obama 
committed the whole US government to end the Ebola outbreak. Later, the President 
announced US$319 million for the response, making the West African Ebola crisis a 
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National Security Priority. The United States strategy encompassed the deployment of 
up to 3,000 military personnel to build 17 Ebola Treatment Units with 1700 beds and 
provide logistical support to West Africa as part of Operation United Assistance 
(Thomas et al.,2016; Adler et al., 2018).  
As part of the effort of the US in responding to the epidemic, US troops were 
sent to West Africa to support a cross-section of activities. These activities included 
constructing mobile and fixed lab capacity and capability to diagnosing EVD, training 
indigenous nationals in the appropriate application of personal protective equipment 
(PPE), erecting Ebola Treatment Units, delivering logistic support, and safeguarding 
security (Sipos et al., 2018). According to Nevin and Anderson (2016), the 
preliminary response began with the U.S. Africa Command stating their arrival at the 
Roberts International Airport (RIA) on 18 September 2014 with seven soldiers and a 
single forklift. A few days afterward, 45 personnel arrived in Liberia, set up a 
command headquarters, and were joined by 100 more personnel by 25 September.  
Later, on 30 September, the Pentagon announced significant plans of deploying 1400 
troops in October and by October 3, deployment instructions had been issued for an 
additional deployment of up to 3,200 personnel  (Nevin & Anderson, 2016).  
In spite of the positive impact, the US deployment of troops may have made in 
combating the EVD in Liberia, Kim (2014), attempted to impugn what in his view 
was a double standard approach of the United States in dealing with more important 
global issues such as the EVD. Kim (2014), argued that Secretary of State, John Kerry 
had rallied a global coalition for a mission of “utmost urgency” to battle the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which according to Kerry was a cancer, a disease that 
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every civilized country should be responsible enough to stamp out before it spreads.  
According to Kim (2014), however, regarding a real disease, the United States had 
delayed the much needed response even after the disease had killed up to about 1,552 
people by the time Kerry was still soliciting global coalition to fight ISIS.  
It must be understood that although the Ebola epidemic of 2014 in West 
Africa posed a considerable threat to not only West Africa, but also the entire Africa 
and indeed the rest of the world. In my view it is incongruous to compare the United 
States response to the Ebola epidemic, and the soliciting a global coalition against 
ISIS. It is important to point out the fact that countries have their threat profiles and 
priorities in their foreign policies and their attempts to take leadership roles in global 
affairs. Such priorities may dictate a country’s priorities in responding to different 
security threat scenarios.  Arguably, it would have been appropriate if the United 
States’ response to the Ebola epidemic had been swifter. However, to compare the 
response of the Ebola epidemic to a global response to ISIS reduces the importance of 
response to epidemics by world leaders into a different arena of global politics.  
British Troops in Sierra Leone 
In Sierra Leone, as the crisis became more complex and difficult to handle, 
The UK Ministry of Defense, and later other friendly countries including Canada and 
Ireland committed troops in support of DFID assistance programs (Forestier et al., 
2016). According to Reece et al. (2017), The British military played very important 
roles in shaping the UK's Ebola response in Sierra Leone. The British Military set up 
the military Ebola Treatment Centre (ETC), at Kerry Town about 31 km from 
Freetown, the first in-country facility, devoted to the treatment of both international 
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and local medical professionals. The facility was staffed and supported by several 
nurses, medical and operational personnel from both the British National Health 
Services and the military. The military also provided both military and civilian 
personnel involved in the Ebola response with force protection measures to mitigate 
the Ebola Disease risk involved in the operation (Forestier et al., 2016). 
Further, the Royal Engineers assisted and advised on the construction of 
ETCs. The Royal Navy ship RFA Argus also provided logistical support and offshore 
treatment for non-Ebola related sicknesses (Reece et al., 2017). The Navy further 
provided support for the transportation of medical equipment and supplies to Sierra 
Leone. The military response to the Ebola crisis in both Liberia and Sierra Leone may 
be seen as among the major contributory factors in successfully bringing the EVD 
under control. Sandvik (2015), however, argued that considering the deployment of 
military personnel, strategies and tactics as the main reason for success is prejudiced, 
because it does not only degrade the spirit of the nationals of Ebola affected countries, 
but also the efforts of local health workers and other humanitarians to control the 
outbreak. Sandvik (2015), further emphasized that when such humanitarian crisis are 
described as ‘national security’ issues as was the case of  the 2014 epidemic before 
the deployment of the military, it is easier to conceal evidence from the public, 
thereby, making it extremely difficult to assess the actual effectiveness of the 
response.  
It is clear that in spite of the roles played by both the United States and British 
militaries in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively, it is not known if part of the 
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efforts or resources of these militaries were channeled to assist the non-medical 
emergency management agencies to coordinate the response to the Ebola crisis. 
Summary 
The purpose of chapter two was to critically examine the significant issues 
relating to the Ebola outbreak in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In this chapter, the 
researcher briefly highlighted some literature on the theoretical framework for the 
study, and after that, delved deeper into the real issues about the Ebola outbreak in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2014 - 2015, with the view to finding gaps in the 
literature as a basis for this study. The key themes that were identified in the available 
literature includes history of the Ebola virus; the socio-political factors that led to 
rapid spread of the virus; the failure of system in Liberia and Sierra Leone that 
contributed to the spread of the disease; and the effect the outbreak had on the socio-
economic development of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Other thematic areas that were 
identified in the available literature included the international panic and stigmatization 
of Africans because of the outbreak in West Africa; and the potential for the Ebola 
virus to be weaponization for bioterrorism. The reviewed literature also covered the 
response of governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone to the crisis, the response of the 
international community and then the involvement of the military from Britain and 
the United States. 
After the review, the researcher realized that not much was known about the 
roles played by the non-medical emergency management agencies such as NDMA 
and The Disaster Management Department of ONS of the Republic of Sierra Leone, 
the agencies that have the primary responsibility of coordinating emergency 
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management in the respective countries. Further, the researcher observed that a gap 
remains in the available literature on the roles that may have been played by 
emergency management agencies in the West African region in support of the 
international community’s efforts in responding to the crisis in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone.  The researcher filled this gap in knowledge by describing and documenting 
the specific roles played and should have been played by non-medical emergency 
management agencies of Liberia and Sierra Leone, and such agencies in West African 
countries in responding to the 2014 Ebola epidemic. 
Chapter 3 focused on the research methods and procedures that were used to 
answer the questions to the gaps raised in the available literature. The chapter further 
gives clarity on the respondents to the research question, delves deeper into the issues 
of ethics and gives details of the data collection and analysis. Chapter 3 set the stage 
for the research to be conducted, leading to discussions on the finding, and subsequent 
recommendations in Chapters 4 and 5.  
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
In this study, the researcher explored the roles EMA play in managing 
epidemics that afflict countries and transcend national boundaries. The purpose was to 
enquire about the role nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone played in 
managing the Ebola crisis of 2014, and if no significant roles were played, what roles 
such agencies should have played in managing this crisis. Chapter 3 includes research 
questions, research method, and methodology information. The researcher also 
highlights procedures for recruitment of participants for the study and how data were 
collected and analyzed. The chapter also highlights issues of trustworthiness. The 
researcher also discussed ethical issues and protection of participants as well as the 
role of the researcher. 
Research Design and Rationale 
Research Questions 
RQ1: What roles did nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone play 
when responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis?  
RQ2: What roles should nonmedical EMAs of Liberia and Sierra Leone and 
similar agencies in West Africa have played when responding to the 2014 Ebola 
crisis? 
Research Tradition 
According to Creswell (2014), research methodologies are approaches and 
processes for research that involve broad assumptions, painstaking methods, and the 
collection of data and subsequent analysis. The research method also refers to the 
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overall plan that a scholar chooses to incorporate various parts of the study in a 
comprehensible and analytical way, to ensure that the research problem is adequately 
addressed. Yin (2014) identified three main research methods: qualitative, 
quantitative, and mixed research methods.  The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
(2008) defined qualitative research as “a form of social inquiry that focuses on the 
way people interpret and make sense of their experiences and the world in which they 
live” (para. 4).  Qualitative research fundamentally deals with witnessing a 
phenomenon from the viewpoint of the people being studied. 
According to Lambert and Lambert (2012), different approaches to qualitative 
studies include phenomenology, grounded theory, and ethnography. In addition to the 
traditional and well know qualitative methods, other scholars have also identified 
generic qualitative inquiry as suitable for dissertations (Kennedy, 2016; Percy et al., 
2015). Percy et al. (2015) said “generic qualitative inquiry investigates people's 
reports of their subjective opinions, attitudes, beliefs, or reflections on their 
experiences, of things in the outer world” (p. 78). According to Kennedy (2016), the 
generic qualitative inquiry does not involve committing to a specific methodology or 
philosophical viewpoint. 
For this generic qualitative inquiry, the researcher used the pragmatic 
descriptive approach to describe the experiences of EM experts in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone who witnessed the Ebola crisis that ravaged the Mano River region of West 
Africa. In addition to EM experts from Liberia and Sierra Leone, the research also 
described the skills of EM experts from the Ghana NADMO and subject matter 
experts from the KAIPTC 
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Justification for Choice of Qualitative Method 
According to Marshal (1996), the choice of a research methodology should 
not necessarily be an issue of preference of the researcher but should be determined 
by the research questions. Percy et al. (2016) emphasized that sometimes when the 
more traditional qualitative approaches such as ethnography, case study, grounded 
theory, and phenomenology are not suitable for one reason or the other, scholars 
should consider a more generic qualitative inquiry approach. Percy et al. (2016) said 
that “though phenomenologists explore people’s opinions, beliefs and feelings among 
others; the phenomenologist’s curiosity is in the inner dimension, qualities, and 
structures (essences) of those cognitive processes, but not in the external content that 
may trigger the cognitive processes” (p. 77). It is significant to emphasize that this 
study seeks to investigate the external professional opinions and views of respondents 
in answering the research questions and not necessarily their lived and internal 
psychological experiences during the Ebola crisis. Consequently, the generic 
qualitative inquiry offers the best approach for the study. 
Additionally, a generic qualitative inquiry is suitable because it is aligned with 
the research problem, purpose statement, and research questions. This research 
methodology also offered the researcher the opportunity to collect pertinent data to be 
able to understand the opinions and feelings of EMs who endured the Ebola crisis in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone and how, in their view, the crisis should have been managed 
from a nonmedical expertise point of view. Regarding sampling and data collection, 
the purposeful sampling method was used. Only a targeted group of EM professionals 
participated.  
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Role of the Researcher 
According to Simon (n.d.), in a qualitative study, the researcher is seen as the 
instrument to collect data. Data collection is therefore facilitated mainly through the 
researcher.  Creswell (2014) posited that in the course of data collection, the 
researcher is responsible for “setting the boundaries for the study, collecting 
information through unstructured or semi-structured observations and interviews, 
documents, and visual materials, as well as establishing the protocol for recording 
information” (p. 189).  The researcher’s responsibility in this study included the 
collection of data through interviews with EM experts, transcribing, coding and 
subjecting the evidence to analysis to arrive at credible findings and conclusions.   
According to Greenbank, as cited by Simon (n.d.), the qualitative researcher 
should describe relevant aspects of self, including any prejudices, assumptions, 
expectations, and experiences that qualify his or her ability to conduct the research. 
The researcher worked in Liberia during the peak of the Ebola crisis of 2014. During 
the period, the researcher expected the lead EMAs in Liberia to take a lead role in 
managing the epidemic. However, the researcher did not see much of the roles played 
by the NDMA of Liberia. This observation may prejudice the researcher’s views 
about the findings of the research. 
Research Methodology 
Logic of Participant Selection 
Although many other professionals experienced the Ebola crisis in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, this study employed stratified purposeful sampling and targeted only 
specialists in emergency management.  Participants included a total of 12 emergency 
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management professionals in Liberia NDMA, Sierra Leone ONS, Ghana NADMO 
and a subject expert from the KAIPTC in Accra, Ghana. The researcher reached 
saturation after interviewing three participants each from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Ghana. The researcher ensured that the interviewees cut across the agencies earlier 
indicated in the three countries, to ensure that the findings of the research will be 
quality, transferable and representative of the West African region. 
Criteria for Selection of Participants 
The primary criterion for selecting participants in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
was the presence of participants in these countries during the Ebola Crisis of 2014. 
There was a possibility that new subject matter experts may have joined the 
emergency management agencies of Liberia and Sierra Leone after the epidemic. 
Such people may not necessarily have lived through the crisis as emergency 
management experts and as such may not have the real experience that this research 
seeks to unravel to answer the research questions.   
The criteria that was used to select participants in Ghana was, being an 
emergency management expert from the NADMO, with experience or training in 
managing epidemics, or being a subject matter expert from the KAIPTC. These 
criteria ensured that the questions on emergency response capacities in the West 
African sub-region were adequately answered. 
Sampling Methods 
Marshall (1996) acknowledged three main methods in the careful choice of a 
sample for qualitative research. These include convenience sample, judgment sample 
and theoretical sample.  For this study, the researcher used judgment sampling, also 
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known as purposeful sampling. Marshall (1996), opined that the appropriate size of a 
sample for a qualitative study is one that effectively answers the research question.  
According to Crossman (2017), purposive or judgment sampling is a non-probability 
tester that is carefully chosen due to special characteristics of a population and the 
purpose of the study. Purposive sampling is typically employed when the scholar 
needs to speedily reach a targeted sample, or when the focus of the study is not 
focused on sampling for proportionality.  
Critical case sampling which is a type of purposive sampling will be used in 
this study. Critical case sampling is used when the researcher chooses a case for study 
because it is expected that studying it will reveal insights that can be applied to other 
cases. As a result, the researcher considered critical case purposive sampling as most 
ideal for this study as the sample size will be non- probability and was focused on just 
a beset group of emergency management experts in Liberia and Sierra Leone and 
Ghana. 
Data Collection 
This generic qualitative inquiry typically used data collection techniques that 
elicit participants' reports, views and ideas about how emergency management 
agencies should have handled the Ebola crisis of 2014 but not how “internally” they 
individually felt about the crisis. The research relied mainly on face-to-face and 
telephone interviews with management experts from Liberia NDMA, Sierra Leone 
ONS, Ghana NADMO and subject experts from the KAIPTC in Accra Ghana. 
According to Wyse (2014), employing face-to-face interviews in research ensures 
improved screening of participants.  For instance, the individual being interviewed 
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cannot provide false information during screening questions such as gender, age, or 
race (para 2). When face-to-face interviews are used to collect data, the emotions and 
behaviors of the interviewee can be adequately captured. Although face-to-face 
interviews was the most appropriate data collection method for this study, the 
researcher also used telephone interviews with some of the respondents due to the 
inability of the researcher to travel to Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
To ensure that data was captured accurately, the researcher had an assistant 
who helped during the interviews to also record all that transpired during the sessions. 
The researcher also record all sessions, with voice recorders to ensure that all 
comments were properly captured. After each interview session, the researcher 
playback the recorded version to the interviewees to ascertain if they wanted any 
portions of what they have said changed. This gave the interviewees the opportunity 
to correct their comments and ensure the accuracy of the data collected. The 
researcher also rely on data from media reports, videos and other internet resources on 
the 2014 Ebola epidemic.  
Data Analysis Plan 
Thematic analysis offers a method of data analysis that is malleable and well 
suited for many research approaches. According to Percy et al. (2016), there are three 
types of thematic analysis, namely inductive, theoretical and thematic analyses with 
constant comparison. This research employed the inductive method to analyze the 
data. Percy et al. (2016), posited that inductive analysis requires the researcher to set 
aside all pre-understandings of the issues before the analysis begins. It further requires 
that data collected from each be analyzed individually. Percy et al. (2016), provided a 
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systematic approach to conducting inductive analysis. This approach which the 
researcher used is explained below. 
The researcher took time to peruse and acquaint himself with all data collected 
from each respondent, and intuitively, highlight any sentences, phrases or paragraphs 
that appeared significant. After that, the researcher reviewed all the highlighted and 
used the research questions to decide if the highlighted information was related and 
relevant to the research questions. Subsequently, the researcher eliminated all 
highlighted data that were unrelated to the research questions and stored that data in a 
separate file. Then the researcher did a simple coding of the data with serial numbers 
and pseudonyms to be able to keep track of individual information in the data. 
Further, all items of the data that were related or connected were clustered to 
develop a pattern. Each pattern was described in a phrase that sums it up.  As patterns 
begin to emerge, the researcher identified items of the data that corresponded with the 
specific pattern. These patterns were placed in the previously assembled cluster that 
manifests that pattern.  Furthermore, the researcher took all the patterns and looked 
for predominant themes. This process included combining and clustering the related 
patterns into themes. After all the data had been analyzed themes arranged and paired 
with their corresponding supporting patterns on a matrix. Codes or descriptors for 
each of the data clusters were included in the matrix for further analysis.  For each 
theme, the researcher wrote a detailed abstract analysis, describing the scope and 
substance of each theme. The process was repeated for data from each participant. 
After that, the researcher combined the analysis of data for all participants including 
patterns and themes that were consistent across the participants' data.  
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Trustworthiness Issues 
Burkholder et al. (2016), elucidated that trustworthiness is the qualitative term 
usually used instead of validity for quantitative studies (Kindle Locations 2153-2154). 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), trustworthiness is the degree of confidence a 
researcher can have in the findings of a study.  Trustworthiness in a qualitative study 
is about establishing, credibility; transferability dependability and confirmability to 
ascertain the truth and accuracy of the research findings. 
Credibility 
Lincoln and Guba (1985), specified methods such as prolonged engagement, 
persistent observation, triangulation, peer debriefing and thick description in 
establishing the credibility of research.  Burkholder et al. (2016), also, theorized that 
in a qualitative study, the researcher does not need to use all the strategies related to 
credibility but instead choose the plan or strategy most suitable for the study (Kindle 
Locations 2249 - 2251). For this research, triangulation was used to establish the 
credibility of the findings. Creswell (2014), suggested that data should be collected 
from numerous sources to include interviews, observations and document analysis. 
For this study, the researcher used different types of methods such as gathering data 
through interviews. The researcher also relied on media publications and document 
analysis of other available data from open sources.  The researcher also cross-verified 
information from different sources to ensure that the research findings are reliable, 
cogent and credible. 
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Transferability 
Transferability refers to the researcher's demonstration of how the findings of 
the research can be applicable in other contexts. The findings of this study would 
apply to other scenarios of the management of epidemics by non-medical emergency 
management agencies around the globe. In DeVault’s (2017) view, purposive 
sampling can be used to address the issue of transferability since explicit data is 
exploited in relation to the context in which the data collection occurs. The sampling 
method employed by this study is purposive sampling, and that should make the 
findings of this research transferable.   
Dependability 
Dependability is the extent to which the research findings can be replicated 
with consistency by other researchers based on the information from this study given 
the same resources used for this research. To this end, participants were given the 
opportunity to review the analysis of their responses to ascertain that their thoughts 
and responses were accurately captured and properly analyzed.  Other researchers and 
subject area experts from the KAIPTC were relied upon to confirm or corroborate the 
research findings. 
Confirmability 
Confirmability refers to the extent to which the results could be confirmed or 
corroborated by others. One method of establishing confirmability is ensuring an 
efficient audit of the entire research process to ensure that the research findings 
accurately conforms to the responses of the interviewees. While this may not be 
established and spelled out in this research, the committee chair and other committee 
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members assigned to this study ensured efficient auditing of the process to ascertain 
the process used to arrive at the research findings.  
It is noteworthy that confirmability also refers to the degree of neutrality of the 
researcher concerning the findings of the study. Bearing in mind the researcher’s 
potential bias and preconceived thoughts, the researcher remained a passive 
participant during the interviews; the researcher only asked questions and allowed the 
respondents to do more of the talking while he recorded. The researcher only asked 
questions to clarify areas that required clarity. 
Ethical Issues  
At all stages of the research process, scholars are faced with ethical challenges 
ranging from who to be selected to be interviewed through the approach to be used in 
collecting data to what information to include or exclude in the research.  If ethical 
standards of research are not adhered to, the researcher risks endangering the privacy 
of his/her respondents and exposing them to harm.  According to Ravitch (2016), the 
privacy of an individual is linked with discretion and “entails decisions about how and 
what data related to participants will be disseminated” (Kindle Location 7325). A 
researcher, therefore, has a vital responsibility of ensuring the protection, the privacy, 
and confidentiality of respondents of a study. Considering that data will be derived 
from emergency management experts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, whose agencies 
probably should have done more in containing the epidemic, there will be the 
requirement to protect their privacy and keep them anonymous in the research since 
that could jeopardize their careers. 
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To ensure that respondents participate in a voluntary manner, the researcher 
asked all participants to sign an informed consent form and informed participants that 
at any point in the process, they were free to withdraw their participation. Participants 
were also informed of the purpose of the research and made to understand that the 
interviews were being recorded. Pseudonyms and nicknames of participants were 
used throughout the study to further ensure confidentiality of participants.  
Further, to avoid making serious ethical mistakes in this study, the researcher 
sought clearance and direction from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Walden 
throughout the research process. Most importantly, IRB approval was sought before 
participants were recruited for subsequent data collection and analysis. 
In the course of the study, the researcher, as a staff of the United Nations, 
consulted the United Nations Ethics Office to be able to interview UN personnel who 
played critical roles in responding to the Ebola epidemic in Liberia. The Ethics 
Office, however, discouraged the researcher and raised an issue of potential conflict 
of interest. The researcher complied with the Ethics Office’s advice and only relied on 
open source information concerning the roles of the United Nations in managing the 
crisis. Therefore, although the researcher remains a staff of the United Nations, the 
discussions, findings and recommendations of this study should not be misconstrued 
as a position of the Organization but merely a personal academic work.   
Summary 
This chapter described and justified the research methodology, how research 
participants were recruited, data collection and analysis methods, ethical issues and 
how they are addressed, as well as issues of trustworthiness relating to the research 
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findings. Having exhausted the key areas and the general methodology to be 
employed in the conduct of the study, this chapter set the stage for Chapter 4, the 
study and results, and subsequently Chapter 5, summary, conclusions and 
recommendations.  
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Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative study was to learn about the roles played by 
nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone in response to the Ebola crisis of 2014 
at the national level. The study also explained roles played by such similar agencies in 
West Africa when managing this epidemic.  Chapter 4 presents data analysis and 
findings involving the two main research questions:  
RQ1: What roles did nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone play 
when responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis?  
RQ2: What roles should nonmedical EMAs of Liberia and Sierra Leone and 
similar agencies in West Africa have played when responding to the 2014 Ebola 
crisis? 
Initially, RQ1 targeted respondents from Liberia and Sierra Leone, whereas 
participants from Ghana only answered RQ2.  Six interview questions were 
considered for each of the research questions. However, in the course of the data 
collection, all respondents were asked interview questions for both RQ1 and RQ2. 
For RQ1, the interview questions involved participants’ experience in crisis 
response to an epidemic such as the Ebola crisis. The researcher also sought to find 
any strategies that participants thought their agencies should have used in responding 
to the crisis, and which other agencies participants thought should have played key 
roles in the response.  
For RQ2, the interview questions involved respondents’ agencies during the 
Ebola crisis and the strategies that were used. The researcher also sought to find any 
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plausible strategies that were not used but could have been used by EMAs. The 
researcher further wanted to know if any other EMA in West Africa assisted in the 
Ebola response, how the response of participants’ agencies helped in dealing with the 
Ebola crisis, and how ECOWAS’ response helped in dealing with the crisis. In this 
chapter, the researcher explains the setting for the research, demographics, data 
collection, and data analysis. Subsequently, evidence of trustworthiness is discussed 
along with results and a summary. 
Setting 
The researcher used purposeful sampling in identifying potential participants. 
Following IRB approval, the KAIPTC nominated and introduced the researcher to 19 
EM experts across Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana, all of whom the researcher 
contacted through WhatsApp. Out of the 19, 12 indicated their willingness to 
participate in the study. They sent the researcher their email addresses through 
WhatsApp, after which the researcher sent consent forms to them through email. The 
researcher collected data through face-to-face interviews with four participants in 
Ghana and telephone interviews with seven participants in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
KAIPTC made a conference room available to the researcher where all face-to-face 
interviews and six telephone interviews were conducted. Two telephone interviews 
were done from the researcher’s car. All interviews were conducted at a convenient 
time for participants, and the researcher ensured that confidentiality was guaranteed.  
Participation in the study was voluntary, and the researcher ensured that there were no 
undue pressures on participants to influence their participation. 
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Demographics 
Out of the 19 experts that were contacted, 12 indicated their willingness to 
participate in the study. Although specific demographic information was not 
collected, all participants were adults and above 18 years of age. Eleven of the 
participants were EM experts who worked in the EMAs of their respective countries 
during the Ebola crisis of 2014. All participants from Liberia and Sierra Leone 
practiced as experts in their countries during the crisis. The four participants from 
Ghana, however, did not practice in Liberia nor Sierra Leone, but were involved in 
Ebola preparedness and ready for a response should there have been any case of 
Ebola in Ghana. One of the participants was a subject matter expert and course 
director at KAIPTC, the institution that has been at the forefront of training EM 
experts in West Africa before and after the 2014 Ebola crisis. Consequently, diverse 
opinions  research questions contributed significantly to the findings of the study. 
Table 1 indicates the demographic breakdown of the participants.  
Table 1 
Participant Demographics 
Participants Pseudonym Gender Emergency 
Management 
Expertise 
Country 
Participant 1  Akosa Male Assistant Director 
of the Disaster 
Management 
Department 
Sierra 
Leone 
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Participant 2 Adwoa Female Research Officer 
Disaster 
Management 
Department  
Sierra 
Leone 
Participant 3 Kuku Male Deputy Director of 
Disaster Risk 
Management 
Department 
Sierra 
Leone 
Participant 4 Mpiani Male Disaster 
Management 
Logistics Officer 
Sierra 
Leone 
Participant 5 Kwarteng Male Assistant Director 
Serious Organised 
Crime  
Coordination 
Department  
Sierra 
Leone 
Participant 6 Yeboah Male Assistant 
Coordinator 
Emergency 
Response Logistics 
and Recovery 
Liberia 
Participant 7 Dwomoh Male Manager for Risk 
and Early Warning 
Liberia 
Participant 8 Takyiwa Female Coordinator for 
training  
Liberia 
Participant 9 Dada Male Course Director of 
Disaster 
Management 
Ghana 
Participant 10 Appiah Male Director Migration Ghana 
Participant 11 Nyantakyi Male Director Geological 
Nuclear and 
Radiological 
Disasters 
Ghana 
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Participant 12 Birago Female Director Disease 
Epidemics/ Pests 
and Insect 
Infestations 
Disasters 
Ghana 
                                                                                                            (Table continues) 
Note. 
 * For reasons of confidentiality, pseudonyms are used instead of the actual names of 
respondents.  
* Listing of participants is not necessarily according to the chronology of when they 
were interviewed 
Data Collection 
Data were collected from 12 emergency management experts within 2 months 
across three countries, using a semi-structured interview method. Each interview took 
approximately 50 minutes or less. At the beginning of each interview, the researcher 
briefly discussed the consent form and asked if participants were comfortable being 
part of the study, before seeking their final consent. The researcher also informed all 
participants that the interview was being audio recorded and reassured participants of 
the full confidentiality of the process. The researcher emphasized that participation 
was voluntary, and participants were free to cease to be part of the process at any 
point if they lost interest in the study and wish to stop participating. Data were mainly 
collected through face-to-face and phone interviews.  In three of the face-to-face 
interviews, and two telephone interviews, the researcher had a Walden Doctoral 
student as a research assistant who helped with the data collection.  
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Table 2 
Data Collection Method 
Participants Face-to-
Face 
Telephone Email Location  
Akosa  X  KAIPTC 
Adwoa  X  Researcher’s Car 
Mpiani  X  Researcher’s Car 
Kwarteng  X  KAIPTC 
Takyiwa  X  KAIPTC 
Yeboah  X  Researcher’s 
Residence 
Dwomoh  X  Researcher’s Car 
Birago X   Participant’s 
Residence 
Dada X   KAIPTC 
Appiah X   KAIPTC 
Nyantakyi X   KAIPTC 
Kuku   X  
 
Data Analysis  
In this generic qualitative inquiry, the researcher used the inductive thematic 
analysis approach. According to Percy et al. (2015), the inductive analysis is driven 
by information and it discourages the fitting of data into any pre-existing categories. 
Thomas (2003) posited that the fundamental purpose of the inductive analysis 
methodology is to enable a study’s results to develop from the common, dominant, or 
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major themes enclosed in raw data, without the limitations imposed by structured 
approaches (p. 2). According to Percy et al., (2015), the inductive analysis method 
requires that the researcher sets aside all foreknowledge of the issue being 
investigated before the analysis begins. Data gathered from each respondent such as 
interviews and open-ended questionnaire among others are analyzed exclusively. 
After subjecting the data collected from each individual to thorough analysis, the 
repeating patterns and themes from all individual data are synthesized together into a 
combined synthesis with the view to understanding the implications of the themes in 
relation to the research question.  
Percy et al. (2015), outlined the following 12 important steps to follow when 
using inductive analysis:  
1. Review and familiarize yourself with the data collected from each 
participant (interviews, journals, field notes, records and documents). 
Read the documents and highlight intuitively any sentences, phrases, or 
paragraphs that appear to be meaningful. During this process the 
researcher immerses him/herself in each participant’s data individually.  
2. Review the highlighted data and use your research question to 
decide if the highlighted data are related to your question.  Some 
information in the transcript may be interesting, but not relate to your 
question. 
3. Eliminate all highlighted data that are not related to your question. 
However, start a separate file to store unrelated data. You may want to 
come back and reevaluate these data in the future.  
4. Take each piece of data and code it. The code can be very simple, 
like a serial number or an address – simply a way to keep track of 
individual items of data.  
5. Cluster the items of data that are related or connected in some way 
and start to develop patterns. For each distinct pattern you discern, 
describe it in a phrase or statement that sums it up. If feasible or useful, 
assign a second level code to the patterns too. Note that the words 
describing the patterns are no longer the words of the participants, but 
your own. In field-specific research (e.g., psychology), attempt to make 
these words meaningful to specialists in the field (e.g., psychologists).   
6. As you start to see patterns, identify items of data that correspond to 
that specific pattern. Place them in the previously assembled clusters 
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(see 5) that manifest that pattern. Direct quotes taken from these data 
(transcribed interviews, field notes, documents, etc.) will elucidate the 
pattern. (The name or descriptor of your pattern thus is a more abstract 
phrase, whereas the data themselves are direct words from 
participants.)   
7. Take all the patterns and look for the emergence of overarching 
themes. Themes are “patterns of patterns.” This process involves 
combining and clustering the related patterns into themes. As you see 
meaningful themes across patterns, assign a yet-more-abstract 
descriptor to the theme. Use standard psychological language and 
terms. This will be a third level of abstraction, supported by the 
patterns, in turn illustrated by the direct data.   
8. After all the data have been analyzed, arrange the themes in a kind 
of matrix with their corresponding supportive patterns.  (The patterns 
are used to elucidate the themes, just as the word data are used to 
support and illustrate the pattern descriptors). In the matrix, include the 
codes or descriptors for each of the data clusters. Thus, the supporting 
layers of words/text can easily be accessed when discussing an 
individual theme in your final report.  
9. For each theme, write a detailed abstract analysis describing the 
scope and substance of each theme.   
10. (Complete this process for each participants’ data)  
11. Then combine the analysis of data for all participants including 
patterns and themes that are consistent across the participants’ data.  
12. Finally, the themes are synthesized together to form composite 
synthesis of the data collected regarding the question under inquiry. 
(pp. 80 – 81) 
 
The researcher used the thematic inductive analysis approach provided by 
Percy et al, (2015) to analyze all the data collected. As suggested in the thematic 
inductive analysis approach, the researcher engrossed himself in each individual data 
collected from participants. The researcher subsequently highlighted all relevant 
phrases, sentences, and paragraphs that were relevant to the research questions. Then 
the less relevant data were deleted and saved separately. The relevant data were then 
put on an excel sheet for critical scrutiny and coding. The researcher grouped all the 
data that were related and developed categories from the individual data.  The 
researcher then subjected the categories to further analysis for emerging themes. For 
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each theme derived from each respondent, the researcher wrote a brief abstract of 
what the participant meant, with direct quotations from the interview.  
The process was repeated for all 12 respondents. Subsequently, the researcher 
moved all the themes and written abstract of each respondent on a single spreadsheet 
for a more detailed analysis to synthesize what all the respondents said, to answer the 
research questions.  Nine themes emerged from the transcribed data. These included; 
coordination, communication, the inclusion of traditional and religious leaders; the 
whole society approach; and control of the movement of people and cultural practices. 
Other themes included autonomy, planning; border control; and ECOWAS.  
The researcher further used NVivo software to assist in the generation of 
frequently used words that emerged from the data collected from all respondents (see 
Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Word cloud obtained from data analysis using NVivo. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Burkholder et al. (2016), said that trustworthiness is the qualitative term 
usually used instead of validity for quantitative studies. According to Lincoln and 
Guba (1985), trustworthiness is the degree of confidence a researcher can have in the 
findings of a study.  In this generic qualitative inquiry study, trustworthiness was 
established through credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability to 
ascertain the truth and accuracy of the research findings.  
Credibility 
Lincoln and Guba (1985), specified methods such as prolonged engagement, 
persistent observation, triangulation, peer debriefing, and thick description in 
establishing the credibility of the research. Burkholder et al. (2016), said that in a 
qualitative study, the researcher does not need to use all the strategies related to 
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credibility but instead choose the plan or strategy most suitable for the study. For this 
research, the researcher used triangulation to establish the credibility of the findings. 
Creswell (2014) suggested that data should be collected from numerous sources to 
include interviews, observations, and document analysis. For this study, the 
researcher interviewed different emergency management experts from across three 
different countries. Saturation was reached after interviewing three respondents each 
from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana. The researcher also relied on official open-
source documents from emergency management agencies as well as media reports to 
triangulate the data collected from respondents. The researcher also cross-verified 
information from among respondents during the member checking process to ensure 
that various respondents held similar views on the data. These processes ensured that 
the research findings are reliable, compelling, and credible.  
Transferability 
Transferability refers to the researcher's demonstration of how the findings of 
the research can be applied in other contexts. The findings of this study would apply 
to other scenarios of the management of epidemics by non-medical emergency 
management agencies around the globe. According to DeVault (2017), purposive 
sampling can be used to address the issue of transferability since explicit data is 
exploited concerning the context in which the data collection occurs. The researcher 
used a purposive sampling method and targeted only emergency management experts 
who played key roles in their respective countries during the Ebola crisis of 2014 in 
West Africa. The professional views and opinions from these experts make the 
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findings of this study transferable to the management of epidemics by non-medical 
emergency management agencies elsewhere across the globe. 
Dependability 
Dependability is the extent to which the research findings can be replicated 
with consistency by other researchers based on the information from this study, given 
the same resources used for this research. To this end, the researcher ensured that 
participants were given the opportunity to review the analysis of their responses to 
ensure that their thoughts were accurately captured through transcript review. This is 
an indication that if another researcher contacts the same participants and asks the 
same questions, the researcher is likely to get the same or very similar responses from 
the respondents. Further, the researcher also ensured the dependability of the findings 
by abiding by all the data analysis tenets of generic qualitative inquiry.  As a result, if 
another researcher has the same resources and uses the same approach, that researcher 
is likely to arrive at the same findings as that for this study.  
Confirmability 
Confirmability refers to the extent to which the results could be confirmed or 
corroborated by others. One method of establishing confirmability is ensuring an 
efficient audit of the entire research process to ensure that the research findings 
accurately conforms to the responses of the interviewees. While this may not be 
established and spelled out in this research, the researcher’s committee chair and other 
committee members ensured efficient auditing of the process to ascertain the process 
used to arrive at the research findings.  
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It is noteworthy that confirmability also refers to the degree of neutrality of the 
researcher concerning the findings of the study. Bearing in mind his potential bias and 
preconceived thoughts, the researcher remained a passive participant during the 
interviews. The researcher only asked questions and allowed the respondents to do 
more of the talking while the researcher recorded. The researcher only asked 
questions to clarify areas that required clarity.  Further, the researcher approached the 
data analysis with an open mind and cleared himself of all foreknowledge of the 
Ebola crisis, to ensure that there were absolutely no biases in the data analysis.   
Results 
In this section, the researcher presents the findings of the study after a 
thorough analysis of all the data collected. As indicated in earlier sections, data was 
collected from 12 emergency management experts from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Ghana through face-to-face and telephone interviews. The interviews were guided by 
six questions for each of the two main research questions. The themes, which 
emerged from RQ1 included coordination, communication, and inclusion of 
traditional and religious leaders. Other themes were the whole society approach and 
control of the movement of people and cultural practices. Themes that emerged from 
RQ2 were autonomy, planning, border control, and ECOWAS. In this section, the 
researcher presents a discussion and a descriptive narrative of the themes under the 
two main research questions with direct quotations from the respondents.  
RQ1 
RQ1: What roles did nonmedical EMAs of Liberia and Sierra Leone play 
when responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis? 
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Five main themes were identified. These were coordination, communication, 
and inclusion of traditional and religious leaders, whole society approach, and control 
of the movement of people and cultural practices. 
Theme 1: Coordination 
Coordination remained a dominant theme that runs through the data from 
many of the respondents across the three countries where the data was collected. Most 
of the respondents alluded to the fact that the central and key roles that were played 
by the emergency management agencies were coordination. Agreeably, coordination 
remains the central role of emergency management agencies during a crisis. Although 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the emergency management agencies functioned as 
departments under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the ONS respectively, these 
departments somehow played coordination roles during the response to the Ebola 
epidemic of 2014.   
Akosa gave a brief legal backing to the constitutionally mandated role of the 
ONS in coordinating crisis in Liberia. According to him, “the ONS is the statutory 
body for the coordination and management of disasters whether manmade or natural 
as provided for by the National Security and Central Intelligence Act 2002.”  
Coordination became even more crucial in Sierra Leone when it was realized that the 
Ministry of Health could no longer deal with the crisis. The ONS later took a 
leadership role in the coordination efforts with its structures in the provinces.  
According to Akosa, "ONS coordinators were in all the 14 administrative districts of 
the country. ONS had coordinators deployed in all districts. These coordinators were 
very instrumental in the coordination and management of the Ebola outbreak. Some 
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of them were visible and provided strong leadership, while others did not. Pujehun is 
a case of where the coordinator there provided astute leadership."  
Adwoa emphasized the crucial coordination role, which was played by the 
ONS. She indicated that the ONS brought together all key stakeholders and 
coordinated their activities.  She stated that the ONS had coordination meetings with 
key government stakeholder agencies and ministries to respond to the crisis 
appropriately. She noted, “We held out meeting, the National Security Council 
(NSC), National Communication Coordination Group (NSCCG), and it involved all 
the setup. It involved the Republic of Sierra Leone Army (RSLAP), the Sierra Leone 
Police (SLP) Sierra Leone Fire Force and Correctional Center, Immigration, and all 
the rest of them.”  Adwoa also indicated that the ONS coordinated the response 
activities of the international governmental and non-governmental agencies.  She said, 
"we moved with partners (both national and international partners), with the WHO, 
MSF, UNICEF, among others. UNICEF was providing water and sanitation and 
dealing with children. They have to save the children, we have the street child, a lot of 
international organizations, and we have the UNDP, WFP, a host of them. We called 
them all to coordination meetings." 
Mpiani buttressed the fact that the ONS played a key leadership role in the 
coordination of the response to the crisis. He indicated, "At the district and provincial 
levels, the ONS, together with other local and international partners, provided 
leadership of the district Ebola response centers and the command centers where we 
established the coordination of the Ebola response. So basically, this is the roles we 
played in the Ebola response." 
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Kwarteng rather emphasized the important strategic coordination role the ONS 
played. He averred that the ONS provided strategic coordination advice to the 
Government to declare a state of emergency.  He noted that “So basically what we did 
as a security agency, as a non-medical emergency agency, was to provide 
coordination and strategic advice to the government of Sierra Leone to first declare a 
national health emergency." 
In Liberia, all the respondents emphasized the important coordination roles 
that the emergency management agency played. Takyiwa highlighted that the NDMA 
has the sole responsibility of coordinating the response of all emergencies in the 
country. However, during the crisis, that role was limited.  She stated, "We have the 
sole responsibility of being the coordinators of any national emergency, but at the 
time of the crisis, the role played was more limited. We served as the co-chair of the 
national task force that was set up by the President." 
Theme 2: Communication 
According to some of the participants, during the crisis, the uninformed public 
churned out several misleading information. It was after the emergency management 
agencies of the respective countries intervened and changed the message that the rate 
of infections began to go down. Adwoa indicated that messages were repackaged and 
directed to the people in a bid to educate the public on preventive measures. She 
noted, “We came out with short messages like wash your hand, wash your hand every 
day and don't shake hands with people." According to Adwoa, most of the people in 
Sierra Leone were of the view that the main symptom of Ebola was blood oozing 
from the patient. However, in her view, people needed to be tested as soon as they 
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saw any sign of bad health, and sick people did not have to wait until they saw blood 
before they are tested. To buttress her point, Adwoa stated: "We had to tell the people 
that it was not only blood that you will see that you can say is Ebola, but you also 
need to be tested."  
Further, the general belief among the populace was that when people are 
infected, and they go to the holding center, they will die. This misinformation kept 
many infected people who could have received proper care away from the holding 
centers, a situation that led to the death of many. Adwoa indicated, "Whenever 
somebody is affected, people will say when you go to the holding center, you will die. 
Therefore, the ONS sent people there. People were saying when you get the virus; 
you will be vomiting blood. Therefore, when people are not vomiting blood, they 
think they are okay. So, it was the ONS that change the narrative for people to be 
encouraged to seek care at the holding centers and prevent further spread of the 
virus". 
Kwarteng shared a similar opinion that the ONS had to correct some wrong 
information that was in the public domain. He indicated, "There was this kind of 
distortion of information that was flowing into the public domain that there was no 
Ebola, like the moment you contact Ebola you are dead. A lot of people the moment 
they feel sick instead of calling to seek services, they were wasting away, and so we 
ensured that communication became a key concept. Messages were sent through 
videos, using radio, nontraditional methods, traditional methods, and everyone was on 
board to get the population to understand why they needed to seek help when they fell 
sick.”   
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Mpiani highlighted that one of the key roles the ONS played was providing 
information on safe practices. He averred that "the role my agency played was to 
provide information on safe practices such as public gathering, washing of the dead, 
burying of the dead, the activities of traditional healers, the selling and eating of 
bushmeat, strike action for health workers, communities that were resisting burial of 
Ebola victims among others".  
In Liberia, the situation was similar. At the beginning of the crisis, the public 
was misinformed into believing that as soon as a person gets the Ebola virus, he or 
she will die.  This misinformation rather kept people living in denial even when they 
had contracted the virus. According to Takyiwa, "the messages that were being sent 
out at the beginning of the Ebola response were not messages that were clear 
enough." According to her, "such messages as if you have a virus, you will die. If you 
are exposed to the virus, you will die. If you come in contact with someone who has 
the virus, you will die the messages that scared people away" At the later stages, the 
NDRC intervened and changed the wrong message. Takyiwa said, "at the latter part 
of it, the messages were revised.  Revised in a sense, when you come in contact with 
the virus or come in contact with somebody who has the virus, and you report 
yourself to the health worker or a health facility or a nearby center, you have a 
possibility, or there is a possibility you will not die." 
Yeboah emphasized on how the NDRC used strategic communication to 
reduce the rate of infections. He indicated that initially, the message that was churned 
out was that people would die if they touched anyone with the Ebola virus. Yeboah 
stated, "The first messaging was if someone has the Ebola, if anyone touches the 
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person, that person gets infected and died" However, later, the NDRC intervened and 
changed the message. Yeboah further indicated that the message was later changed. 
He said, "later the messaging had to be redesigned to say look if you just wear the 
plastic hand or the PPE and touch stuff or infected people, that person will survive it 
does not mean you will die. So you see that was the role of the NDRC under the 
ministry of internal affairs then." 
Dwomoh buttressed the fact that the message out in public was 
counterproductive to the efforts being made to solve the Ebola crisis in Liberia. The 
wrong message led to people escaping from the treatment centers and unknowingly 
infecting people. Dwomoh stated that the "NDRC had to go and re-coin the message 
because the message "when you attract the virus you die" was also resulting in people 
escaping from treatment centers, and then the transmission was increasing. So, when 
we changed the message, the new message now became you contract the virus and 
seek early treatment, there is a possibility for survival." 
Respondents from Ghana rather emphasized the importance of communication 
in dealing with epidemics. Birago indicated that the NADMO engaged other 
stakeholders such as the Ghana Education Service (GES) and the Ministry of Health 
to educate and inform the public on the Ebola virus to prevent any spread of the virus 
had entered Ghana. Birago stated, “When it comes to awareness, building and 
creating awareness and sensitizing the public, we had GES taking care of the schools. 
Now we had Ministry of Communication and information, coming in to play the role 
of public education, you know creating that public awareness, all right, making sure 
that the airwaves were saturated and actively engaged in offering education as far as 
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Ebola prevention and preparedness was concerned. Also, as far as anything that had to 
do with Ebola education was concerned, NADMO engaged the Ministry of Education, 
Ministry of Communication, to play that integral role." 
 Appiah indicated that in Ghana, NADMO was used in strategic 
communication to sensitize the public about the Ebola Virus. He stated, "we were 
given more of a role of community sensitization, information sharing, and so on 
because aside from everything, NADMO is much diversified. We have staff all the 
way to the communities. Therefore, they thought that it was easy for us to reach the 
various communities to disseminate information. So we were more into 
communication strategies to reach out to the public."  
Theme 3: Inclusion of Traditional and Religious Leaders 
The respective disaster management agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
employed a strategy to include leaders in the societies to respond positively to the 
Ebola crisis. This strategy contributed significantly to reducing the rate of infections 
in both countries.  Some of the respondents indicated that the inclusion of traditional 
leaders was done later. However, it significantly led to bringing the crisis under 
control  
According to Kwarteng, “At the initial stage, we didn’t have the traditional 
authorities fully involved. We should have done that at the very beginning, especially 
when the crisis emanated from the remotest part of the country, we should have had 
the buy-in and active involvement of the local chiefs at that level. However, we later 
included them in the response, and when we did, the people felt a part of the response 
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effort, especially when the communities saw their traditional leaders getting 
involved." 
In Dwomoh’s opinion, the traditional authorities should have been included 
from the very onset of the crisis to avoid more deaths. He stated that “what we did 
was to recruit from the National Traditional Council. We brought chiefs and elders in, 
provided them pieces of training and adequate information on the treatment of the 
virus and mode of transmission, and why there was, need to suspend traditional 
cultural practices. Dwomoh stressed that though this strategy comes in a bit late, it 
helped reduce the rate of infections and deaths significantly. Dwomoh noted, "What I 
think we should have done differently was to get the traditional and religious people 
involved in the crisis response from the onset. It was later we got them involved by 
then we had lost thousands of people.  
Birago shared the same opinion that the inclusion of traditional authorities in 
response to epidemics is extremely important in awareness creation.  She noted, 
"Actively engaging community-based authority, traditional authorities, and leadership 
within our communities to create awareness and mobilize community support for 
Ebola preparedness was crucial. Something that we need to continue to build on 
because any crisis starts within the community, so we need to build capacity within 
our communities to be able to respond to any crisis. She recollected that this approach 
helped significantly in the response. Birago further indicated, “If my mind serves me 
right, I think one thing we tried doing was engaging our traditional authorities to 
support Ebola awareness creation. As part of this sensitization and awareness 
creation, we actively involved the traditional authorities and community leaders 
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within our country. I think that was one thing which was very instrumental. Learning 
lessons from Sierra Leone and Liberia, we knew that, but for the timely intervention 
of these people, these particularly identified people within our communities, it would 
have been worse than what we ever saw."  
Takyiwa mentioned that traditional authorities were included in the response 
as a strategy to get the community on board to help reduce the rate of infections and 
deaths. She indicated, we also had involvement of the chiefs, the town 
superintendents, and District Commissioners all involved in the Ebola response 
process.  
Yeboah saw the involvement of the traditional authorities as a plausible 
strategy in responding to the crisis, due to the power the traditional authorities and 
town chiefs wield in the communities. Yeboah saw the best way to deal with the rate 
of infections was to get the traditional leaders involved to communicate with their 
people to stop such practices that were detrimental to the health and lives of the 
people during the Ebola crisis. Yeboah noted, “One of the strategies we used was to 
inform the traditional chiefs in responding to Ebola because in Liberia the traditional 
chiefs hold a very important role. In Liberia, when someone dies before burying of 
bodies, then they go to bathe the body, then go and have rituals, these practices 
needed to be stopped during the Ebola crisis." The traditional leaders helped in 
stopping these practices to prevent further spread of the virus. 
Theme 4: Whole Society Approach 
 Some of the respondents indicated that one of the plausible strategies that the 
emergency management agencies employed in combatting the Ebola crisis was the 
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wholes society approach. It is essential to underscore the fact that during a crisis, 
getting the whole society involved in dealing with the crisis help significantly in the 
response. Takyiwa noted, "I think now disaster management we have something 
called the Whole of Society Approach, I think that that was not done in the beginning. 
However, later in the response, we engaged the business community, school 
administrators, the local leaders, all to form a part of the Ebola response." According 
to Yeboah, it was necessary to engage all segments of the society at the national and 
regional levels by engaging all stakeholders, including teachers, opinion leaders, other 
religious bodies, and the churches. This was necessary because the churches and 
religious bodies were involved in praying for the dead, and they needed to modify 
their procedures to prevent further spread of the virus."  
 From Birago’s perspective, “In Ghana, an all-inclusive approach in dealing 
with an epidemic such as the Ebola crisis is absolutely necessary to be able to control 
possible infections and subsequent spread. Birago mentioned that "so in terms of 
strategy, it is a holistic kind of approach making sure that every sector or every level 
of our society was actively involved and engaged in making sure that we were able to 
prevent the Ebola crisis in Ghana. Therefore, it was a holistic approach from national 
to regional as well as within our settings into community levels to prevent infections. 
Birago further indicated that the multi-sectoral approach had been a key strategy in 
Ghana in dealing with various forms of disasters. She mentioned that "That is our 
strategy — multi-sectoral approach in responding to emergencies in this country. We 
always have a lead technical agency, but other sectors come to support. We need to 
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strengthen that system, before, during, and after the crisis, and then we learn lessons, 
and we build upon it. And so that cycle goes on."  
Theme 5: Control of Movement of People and Cultural Practices 
In responding to epidemics such as the Ebola crisis of 2014, it becomes 
imperative to control the movement of people to prevent and to reduce the spread of 
the virus. In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, emergency management agencies, 
through the sector ministries under which they operated at the time of the crisis, 
ensuring that the movement of individuals who were suspected to be infected with the 
virus was restricted and confined.  According to Akosa, "method that was adopted by 
the response team to contain further spread of the virus was to quarantine people 
suspected to have come into contact with an infected person. Persons suspected of 
coming into contact with an infected person were quarantined in holding centers." 
Additionally, movement of the wider population was restricted to ensure that 
the infections of the virus was contained and restricted.  The security agencies were 
brought in by the emergency management agencies through the respective sector 
ministries to ensure this strategy. According to Akosa, people's movements were 
restricted, so there were checkpoints created in several places in the country, and we 
also have security personnel again managing the streets" Adwoa indicated that there 
was total Lockdown of some communities to prevent the spread,  According to her 
“we invoked something we call Lockdown. During Lockdown, nobody moves out, 
but the ONS will make passes for people, stakeholders who might work during the 
Lockdown. For instance, during the lockdown, the Ministry of Health will be allowed 
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to play its medical role by bringing  their nurses that will go from house to house to 
check people."  
Further, public gatherings were prohibited in Sierra Leone during the crisis. 
According to Akosa, “The ONS ensured that consistently kept our eyes on public 
gatherings and ensured where ever there were public gatherings. The ONS tried to 
bring to book whosoever was organizing public gatherings. The ONS had staff and 
district coordinators in all the districts. All the districts had command centers, and our 
personnel was part of that arrangement.”  
To halt the spread of the Ebola virus, the emergency management agencies did 
not only have to restrict the movement of people but also significantly alter the 
cultural and religious practices of the citizens. Burial of the dead and its associated 
cultural practices were altered.  According to Akosa, “During the Ebola outbreak, 
there was a moratorium that people should not carry out burials, but they must alert 
the burial team. So such breaches of burials were reported to the Ebola response 
center for quick action. The ONS was responsible for dealing with such breaches.” 
In Liberia, it was customary for the dead to be bathed before burial, a practice 
that increased the spread of the virus. Both Muslims and Christians practiced this 
custom. According to Yeboah, due to the harmful nature of this custom, the NDRC 
under the Ministry of Internal Affairs went out and called all the churches and 
religious bodies to stop burying their dead through traditional means." A system of 
cremation, which was viewed as a safer practice, was introduced.  According to 
Dwomoh, "A system of cremation was introduced, so instead of burial, we were 
cremating bodies. This strategy did not go down well with a lot of people in the 
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country, and there was a plan to demonstrate during the outbreak. Therefore, when we 
got that information, we decided to go back from cremation to dignified burial 
practice, so we would allow families to come and to witness the burial ceremonies of 
their loved ones but under the rightful eye of the greater community involved in 
burials.” 
RQ2 
RQ2: What roles should the non-medical emergency management agencies of 
Liberia and Sierra Leone and similar agencies in West Africa have played in 
responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis?  
Four main themes emerged in answering RQ2. These were autonomy, 
planning, border control, and ECOWAS. 
Theme 6: Autonomy  
Prior to and during the Ebola crisis of 2014 in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it was 
evident that there were no independent emergency management agencies in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. All the participants from Liberia and Sierra Leone indicated that the 
mandated emergency management agencies were in existence but under a government 
ministry. In Liberia, the emergency management agency existed under the name 
NDRC, which was under the Ministry of Interior. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, the 
emergency management agency existed and still exists as a department under the 
ONS. Most of the participants indicated that the lack of autonomy significantly 
affected the competence of the emergency management agencies in carrying out their 
mandated tasks. 
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Akosa elucidated that disaster management agency, as an entity, exists only as 
a department within the ONS under the National Security and Central Intelligent Act 
of 2002. In spite of that issue,  when the crisis began in Sierra Leone, the legally 
mandated institution, the ONS, was not used; instead, the government created another 
body to manage the crisis."  He stated, "During the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, 
there was a constitutional boycott as the government then did not use the statutory 
body but rather created an ad-hoc body referred to as the National Ebola Response 
Centre (NERC)." In Akosa’s opinion, “if there were an autonomous emergency 
management agency with a clearly defined mandate, and left to operate independently 
at the time of the crisis, the agency would have done a more professional job in the 
initial response.” 
Takyiwa, for instance, indicated that “if there was this autonomy that there 
was an agency for crisis and disaster management in Sierra Leone, the health people 
would not have just gone ahead to think that they were in charge.  The agency would 
have just come in swiftly at the initial stages and coordinate everything to save lives. 
However, because they did not know what to do at that time, they could not put the 
situation under control, people were just dying. If we had an autonomous agency, the 
situation would have been under control.”  
Mpiani shared a similar view and indicated, "Well, during the whole Ebola 
process, the ONS has a constitutional mandate, under the National Security and 
Central Intelligence Act, but during the Ebola crisis, it was different. It was torn apart. 
They rather set another body, which was the National Ebola Center (NAC), which 
was not constitutional, to play the role and attain leadership. If we had an autonomous 
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emergency management body, our roles would have been better played when the 
crisis happened” 
Kwarteng was also of the opinion that if there was an autonomous emergency 
management agency in Sierra Leone, the Ebola crisis would have been better dealt 
with. He opined that "we do not have an autonomous agency. What we have is a 
Department for Disaster Management within the ONS. It is just a department.  If we 
had an autonomous agency, our response to the crisis would have been more effective 
at the initial stages because we would have had the funds, we would have had the 
human resource capacity. Because if people are now into that department, everyone 
within the department will be trained adequately in the area of responding and 
managing disaster issues. But as it is, just a unit of four people, five people within the 
department is a difficult thing." 
Kuku emphasized, “The National Security and Central Intelligence Act 2002, 
mandates the ONS as the National Coordinator of all forms of emergency, either man-
made or natural.” According to him, “during the crisis, after the President of the 
country has declared a state of emergency, the ONS coordinates all forms of 
emergency, using strategic leadership through the Strategic Situation Group (SSG) 
Command. The ONS also the National Situation Room, where all information 
pertaining to the emergency is filtered on a daily basis. The ONS also analyzes such 
information in consultation with other Ministries and Departments. The ONS 
thereafter briefs the President on the incident and make recommendations to lessen 
the effect of the threat.”  
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 For Liberia, the respondents expressed the same sentiments that the current 
NDMA was not in existence at the time of the crisis. Rather, there was NDRC under 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. All the respondents alluded to the fact that if an 
autonomous NDMA were in existence at the time of the crisis, the response would 
have been more effective and properly coordinated.  Takyiwa, for instance, indicated 
that “During the Ebola crisis it was not an agency. It was not an autonomous body. It 
was referred to as the National Disaster Relief Commission, NDRC, and that relief 
commission had an office under the Ministry of Interior. Therefore, at that time, it 
was not an agency. We played a role, but it was not the exact role, as the agency, as 
an autonomous body, should play, but we played a role during the Ebola outbreak. So 
whatever role we played was being played through the Minister of Internal Affairs 
who is now the current chair of the board of Directors of the NDMA." 
Yeboah also buttressed the fact that the NDMA was not in existence at the 
time of the crisis. According to him, "in 2014, NDMA had not been legally 
established as an agency. What we had before was the NDRC under the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. It was a department under the Ministry of Internal affairs, and it was 
actually the NDRC who was then in place at the Ebola crisis under the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs." Yeboah was further of the view that having an autonomous disaster 
management agency in Liberia prior to the crisis would have been crucial in the initial 
national response. He indicated that "because we were not an autonomous agency, 
other stakeholders usually dealt with the Ministry of Internal Affairs rather than 
dealing directly with us. This state of affairs significantly hampered our response 
capabilities."  
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Dwomoh highlighted that the National Disaster Management Act was only 
passed in 2016. He gave a historical perspective that prior to that, there had been an 
Executive Order in 1976 by the then-president to establish the NDRC. According to 
Dwomoh, “the National Disaster Management Act was not passed at the time of the 
Ebola crisis; the Act was passed in 2016, which officially established the NDMA. But 
then there was Executive Order by then President of Liberia in 1976 establishing the 
NDRC to deal with dire situations at then. This commission existed under the 
Department of Operation at the Ministry of Internal Affairs.” He also indicated, 
“when the Ebola crisis broke out in 2014 the President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf re-
commission the NDRC to lead on the Ebola crisis.” In his view, if there had been an 
autonomous emergency management agency with the sole role of coordinating all 
disaster response in Liberia before the crisis, the experts in that agency could have 
acted more independently to appropriately respond to the crisis before it could get out 
of hand.  To buttress this point, Dwomoh indicated, "according to the law, the disaster 
agency is responsible for coordinating all disaster-related activities in the country."  
Theme 7: Planning 
Some of the respondents indicated that prior to the crisis, there were no 
emergency response plans in place is not only Liberia and Sierra Leone, but also in 
other countries in West Africa.  Most of the respondents shared the view that if 
emergency management agencies had very comprehensive plans in place before the 
Ebola epidemic, the crisis could have been better managed to save lives. In Sierra 
Leone, there were no plans in place to deal with the epidemic because no one thought 
about Ebola. This state of affairs led to confusion at the beginning of the crisis.  
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Akosa noted, "Nobody knew we were going to have Ebola, so we did not plan on how 
we were going to respond to it. In fact, from the beginning, there was a lot of 
confusion as to what to do, what to manage, and what not to manage.  At the time the 
Ebola broke out, there was no comprehensive plans and policies to respond to it."  
Kwarteng indicated that due to a lack of planning when the crisis began, it was not 
taken as seriously as it should have. Kwarteng noted, "The structures and plans were 
not in place to respond to the crisis of that nature mainly due to the fact that disease 
was affecting the country for the very first time. We had heard of Ebola in remote 
places as the case may be, and there were a whole lot of challenges around even the 
reality of the disease. Therefore, at some level, it was not treated with the seriousness 
it deserved.” 
 In Liberia, however, there was a National Influenza Plan in place prior to the crisis, 
but it was only in a draft form. This plan was developed after the crisis began. 
Takyiwa intimated that “we had a draft National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
and Response Plan. So, the first thing that we did was to develop an Ebola 
Preparedness and Response Plan out of the draft document that we had.” Yeboah was 
of the view that "Prior to the crisis, what my agency should have done was to plan. 
We needed to plan for any kind of disaster management response.  We should have 
planned. We should have done a whole pandemic plan and who responds to what in 
case of emergency, but we failed to do so" Dwomoh buttressed the fact that after the 
crisis, the NDMA should have immediately developed a pandemic plan to deal with 
future occurrences. He stressed, “There was no response plan in place prior to the 
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crisis. So after the crisis, we should have gone to prepare an epidemic response plan, 
and that should have been an immediate step after the outbreak by the NDMA."  
 Joint planning among West African Countries for epidemics is very crucial in 
responding to such epidemics that transcend the boundaries of countries. Birago 
stressed the importance of such planning by emergency management agencies in West 
Africa due to the fact that no such joint plans exist even after the Ebola crisis. Birago 
mentioned that "So until we get these things right, where we are meeting regularly, 
we are networking and we are training together, trust me, we will not be able to 
respond appropriately to epidemics like the Ebola crisis. For now, my strong antidote 
to a crisis is that we should be able to work before, we need to have that working 
relationship with all the technical agencies, in the respective countries,  do our plans 
together, do training together, have memorandum of understanding, begin to look at 
the resources that we need and advocate strongly for it. These are preparedness. Once 
we get this right, the response will be easy." 
Appiah was emphatic that there were no plans in place in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone prior to the crisis. In his view, it would have been appropriate if other 
emergency management agencies had rallied to support these countries to plan and 
respond to the crisis. Appiah noted that "Liberia and Sierra Leon did not have any 
disaster management plans. When the Ebola started and was simmering, we could just 
have gone out there to help them to develop a plan, a very simple plan to manage the 
situation, but we stayed away." 
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Theme 8: Border Control 
Managing the border with other countries is very crucial in controlling 
epidemics such as Ebola Virus Disease, which transcend international boundaries. It 
is crucial that once there is an outbreak in a neighboring country, other countries 
coordinate and collaborate to control the movement of people across borders to 
prevent further spread of the disease. It is imperative that when epidemics break out, 
the authorities coordinate and quarantine the epicenter to avoid further spread. In 
West Africa, when the disease broke out in Guinea, the authorities in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone were slow in coordinating and controlling the movement of people 
among these countries. This situation led to the spread of the disease from Guinea to 
Sierra Leone and Liberia. According to Akosa, “The borders between Sierra Leone 
and Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia are very porous, and for that reason, efforts 
should have been made to coordinate with the other countries to control the 
movement of people to prevent a spread of the disease at the very beginning of the 
crisis. Akosa further indicated that the Kailahun District, where the disease was first 
recorded in Sierra Leone, should have been quarantined as soon as the first EVD case 
was recorded. He noted "Kailahun District borders with Guinea and Liberia. The very 
first positive case of the Ebola virus in Sierra Leone was recorded in that district. Lots 
of lives and resources would have been saved had the disease been contained in that 
district by quarantining the few people who had been exposed to the positive case. 
The district wasn't quarantined that led to the spread of the virus to other districts." 
From Adowa’s perspective, in  March, a passenger came in; you know, we 
have this border between Sierra Leone and Guinea, where people do the exchange of 
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goods they come to buy. So, we had this woman who came to the midwife having the 
virus, and after treating her, the virus stated in Sierra Leone.  I think as soon as there 
was an outbreak in Guinea, we should have moved quickly to control our border with 
Guinea and Liberia to prevent a possible spread to Sierra Leone" Mpiani shared a 
similar opinion and indicated "Prior to the crisis, we should have controlled our 
border movement. Our border is so porous. According to the information we got, it 
was a woman who visited her uncle, later went to a funeral, got the disease, and later 
passed it on to everybody. So prior to that, we should have had in place washing of 
hands and checking people that come in and go out of the country."   
Kwarteng emphasized on the fact that the emergency management agencies 
and authorities did not act fast enough to prevent the spread of the disease from 
neighboring countries. Kwarteng mentioned, “I think also the Ebola did not just come 
to Sierra Leone all of a sudden, it came from neighboring countries, Liberia and 
Guinea. We did not engage our counterpart. We should have engaged them from the 
onset and control our borders to prevent a spread into Sierra Leone. We waited left 
our borders open, porous, considering the nature of the socio-economic relationship 
between Sierra Leoneans and Guineans and even Liberia; we could have been alerted 
to know that once this thing happening in Liberia, there is 90 to 99% chance that it 
will happen in Sierra Leone." 
In Liberia, Yeboah was of the opinion that "once there was an outbreak in the 
neighboring countries, the National Repatriation Commission should have worked 
with the NDRC and Ministry of Health to prevent unnecessary movement of people to 
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prevent a spread of the virus. However, that important role was not taken seriously 
and was rather left for foreigners.   
Theme 9: ECOWAS  
Some of the respondents indicated that disaster management Agencies from 
sister West African countries did not directly move into Liberia and Sierra Leone 
during the crisis.  The situation was mainly due to the very high infections and fatality 
rate of the Ebola virus.  Adwoa indicated that no emergency management agency 
from West African Country directly moves into Sierra Leone to support during the 
crisis. However, after the epidemic, some emergency management experts moved in 
to offer their assistance.  She stated, "They didn't come at that time, but after the 
whole crisis, they were coming from Ghana, Nigeria, and all that." Mpiani indicated 
that sister West African countries supported the response but from afar. He indicated, 
"Well, they were supporting us. Because it was possible for them to be infected, so 
they supported us with materials and other equipment." He clarified that "We have the 
ECOWAS management team that is responsible for epidemics and disasters. We had 
a consultation with them, and they supported us. They helped us financially and with 
other materials.” 
Takyiwa, however, indicated emphatically that, to the best of her knowledge, 
she "did not see another disaster management agency from other West African 
countries coming to Liberia to support the ministry, during the crisis." Yeboah also 
indicated ardently that no emergency management agencies from any other country 
came to Liberia to support during the crisis. He stated emphatically, "as far as I 
remember, no emergency management agencies came into Liberia to support during 
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the crisis, probably due to the fear of the possibility of being infected by the virus." 
From Dwomoh’s perspective, no emergency management agency from West Africa 
moved to Liberia to support it. However, at the initial stages, Liberia sent emergency 
management experts to Sierra Leone to support the response in that country. He 
noted, "Actually, no agency from West Africa came into Liberia. There was a point in 
time we had to dispatch professionals to Sierra Leone to support their response."  
Nyantakyi was also emphatic that “Ghana did not send emergency management 
experts to any of the affected countries. I also think no country in West Africa sent 
emergency management experts to affected countries."  
Birago also buttressed the fact that no emergency management agencies were 
dispatched to Liberia and Sierra Leone to support in response to the crisis. She 
emphasized, "ECOWAS response was a far cry from which should be expected 
because it’s like nobody paid attention to the countries that were facing the Ebola 
crisis. It was all because of the fear of the unknown. Not so much was known about 
EBOLA, and everybody was afraid as it was killing, so nobody came out to support 
the affected countries." 
According to Dada, ECOWAS was caught unawares by the crisis in 2014. 
Several of the countries in ECOWAS During the outbreak in 2014 were unprepared 
for such an epidemic. He indicated, “The whole West Africa sub-region was caught 
unawares. The infrastructure and education to create awareness were nonexistence. 
The capacity of stakeholders in emergency response was low; hence, they didn't have 
the expertise to respond effectively until the international community came in to 
assist."  
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Significantly, some of the respondents indicated that although emergency 
management agencies from sister West African countries did not directly move in to 
support, the respective countries provided some other forms of support during the 
crisis. Kwarteng, for instance, indicated that "ECOWAS supported a lot. Of course, 
they helped in coordinating international support for expertise in terms of nurses from 
countries abroad, from countries within Africa to lend their expertise to Sierra Leone. 
Kwarteng further indicated that the Ghana NADMO provided training support 
through the KAIPTC. Kwarteng recalled that “prior to the Ebola crisis,  NADMO, 
through the KAIPTC, has been providing a lot of support, training support to Sierra 
Leone and especially officials from the and other assigned security agencies.” 
Dwomoh indicated that ECOWAS did not directly send emergency management 
experts; however, the regional body supported other countries with an early warning 
during the crisis.   
Summary 
This chapter covered the essentials of how the study was conducted. The 
researcher's discussion setting for the research, the demographics, data collection, and 
data analysis. The researcher further discussed evidence of and the results of the 
analyzed data. Five themes each emerged from both research questions.  The themes, 
which emerged from RQ1 included coordination, communication, and inclusion of 
traditional and religious leaders. Other themes were the whole society approach and 
control of the movement of people and cultural practices. Themes that emerged from 
RQ2 were autonomy, leadership in coordination, planning border control, and 
ECOWAS. 
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RQ1 sought to find answers to the roles that were played by the non-medical 
emergency management agencies of Liberia and Sierra Leone in responding to the 
2014 Ebola crisis. The researcher discussed five dominant themes, including 
coordination, communication, the inclusion of traditional and religious leaders, the 
whole society approach, and control of the movement of people and cultural practices, 
to answer RQ1. The inquiry revealed that during the crisis, the roles, which were 
played by the emergency management agencies in the respective countries, included 
coordination and communication. The individual agencies also used strategies such as 
the inclusion of traditional and religious leaders, the whole society approach, and 
control of cultural practices and movement of people to effectively respond to the 
crisis 
RQ2 sought to address the roles that should have been played by the non-
medical emergency management agencies of Liberia and Sierra Leone and similar 
agencies in West Africa in responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis. The researcher 
identified four themes in answering this question. These themes included were 
autonomy, planning, border control, and ECOWAS. For RQ2, the study discovered 
that the emergency management agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone lacked 
autonomy and operated under government ministries under the names NDRC, and 
Department of Disaster Management in the ONS, respectively. It was also evident 
that before the Ebola crisis, there were no plausible Ebola response plans in place not 
only in Liberia and Sierra Leone but also at the sub-regional level of ECOWAS. 
Additionally, the research established that emergency management agencies from 
105 
 
 
 
ECOWAS member states did not move to Liberia and Sierra Leone to support their 
counterparts in the response during the crisis. 
In Chapter 5, the researcher interprets the findings from the respective themes 
under the two main research questions based on the professional experience of the 
respondents.  The researcher subsequently discussed the limitations of the study after 
he makes recommendations for future studies. Afterward, the researcher discusses the 
implications for social change as well as implications of the findings and 
recommendations for policy-making and professional practice. Finally, the researcher 
summarizes the entire research in the conclusion of the study.  
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Chapter 5:  Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The Ebola crisis of 2014 was arguably the worst infectious epidemic in West 
African history.  Due to the nature of the epidemic, the initial response was more of a  
medical response than it should have been. Although EMAs in afflicted countries 
played key roles during the response, not much is known about the exact roles they 
played and what roles they should have played from the perspective of EM experts. 
The researcher sought to explain roles that were played or should have been 
played by mandated nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone during the Ebola 
crisis of 2014. The researcher also sought to find other roles that were played by 
similar nonmedical EMAs from ECOWAS member states who assisted Liberia and 
Sierra Leone during that crisis. The researcher used the generic qualitative inquiry as 
the study’s methodology, with a focus on the pragmatic descriptive method.  Data 
were collected through interviews from EM experts from Liberia and Sierra Leone 
who were part of the Ebola response in their respective countries during the 2014 
crisis. Data were also collected from EM and subject matter experts from Ghana. 
The study revealed that at the beginning of the crisis, the Ministries of Health 
of the respective countries perceived the epidemic as a mere health crisis. The results 
further revealed that the main roles played by the EMAs included coordination and 
communication.  The involvement of traditional and religious leaders, adopting a 
whole society approach, and controlling the movement and cultural practices of the 
population were identified as among the strategies used by EMAs in responding to the 
crisis. 
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The results of the study revealed that prior to and during the 2014 Ebola crisis, 
EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone had no autonomy, but rather operated under other 
government agencies. It was evident that in Liberia, the EMA operated under the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs with the name NDRC. In Sierra Leone, the disaster 
management agency operated as a department under the ONS. Furthermore, the study 
revealed that planning and border control were key strategies that should have been 
used by EMAs when responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis. Additionally, EMAs from 
ECOWAS member states did not move to Liberia and Sierra Leone to help those 
countries during the crisis, possibly due to the fear of being infected by the virus . 
However, EMAs such as NADMO from Ghana, through the KAIPTC, helped to build 
the capacity of EMAs in West Africa through training after the crisis. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
The researcher used the generic qualitative inquiry to investigate the roles that 
were played and should have been played by nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, as well as similar agencies from ECOWAS member states. Respondents not 
only gave accounts of the roles their agencies played but also professional opinions on 
what roles they thought the EMAs should have played during the Ebola crisis. 
Themes which emerged from RQ1 included coordination, communication, and 
inclusion of traditional and religious leaders. Other themes were the whole society 
approach and control of the movement of people and cultural practices. For RQ2, 
themes that emerged were autonomy, planning, border control, and ECOWAS. 
The functionalist theory was the framework upon which this research was 
based. The theory enabled the researcher to look critically at the respective roles of 
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stakeholders in response to the 2014 Ebola crisis, with a focus on nonmedical 
emergency management agencies.  In light of this, the researcher identified the roles 
that emergency management agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone played or should 
have played in the 2014 Ebola crisis. 
RQ1 
RQ1: What roles did nonmedical EMAs of Liberia and Sierra Leone play 
when responding to the 2014 Ebola crisis? 
Theme 1: Coordination 
Among the key responsibilities of EMAs during disasters is coordination. The 
EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone played important coordination roles, but such roles 
were delayed due to the initial perception of the epidemic as a health crisis. Key 
among the coordination roles played by EMAs included offering strategic 
coordination advice to respective governments and bringing to the table important 
government stakeholders such as ministries, departments and agencies to work 
together to respond to the crisis. 
Between July and September 2014, the Government of Sierra Leone 
established an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) which was primarily used for the 
coordination of activities relating to the Ebola response. The EOC was mainly 
managed under the Ministry of Health and Sanitation and was overseen by the 
Minister for Health or the Chief Medical Officer. However, the ONS, an agency that 
is mandated to coordinate emergency management in the country ,could have better 
managed this oversight and coordination responsibility due to their links with all 
important stakeholders in crisis coordination. According to Gbla (2018), because of 
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the failure of the EOC, the government established the NERC, which included several 
other stakeholders including security agencies. 
In Liberia, in spite of the existence of the NDRC, the president set up a task 
force to coordinate the response to the crisis. The president chaired the coordination 
task force and made the Head of Disaster Relief Commission a cochair. Due to the 
personal involvement and show of interest of the President, coupled with the fact that 
the cochair was the appropriate office responsible for coordination of disasters, the 
strategy worked and contributed to the effective response to the epidemic.   
Initial coordination is crucial in response to every crisis, including what may 
be perceived from the beginning as a health crisis. It is important for mandated EMAs 
if properly set up and trained to be given a free hand to coordinate with all key 
stakeholders to be able to respond appropriately to epidemics such as the Ebola crisis 
before they escalate to the level where infections get out of control. 
The role of EMAs in coordinating  epidemics such as the Ebola crisis  
highlights the importance of the need for institutions to play their mandated roles and 
allowing other agencies to play their key functions to maintain a state of balance and 
social equilibrium for the whole. The relegation of the ONS in Sierra Leone and 
NDRC of Liberia to the background and interference with their mandated roles by 
other institutions during the Ebola crisis contributed significantly to the initial 
confusion and subsequent loss of lives.  
Theme 2: Communication 
Communication is extremely important in crisis response. At the beginning of 
the Ebola crisis, a lot of misinformation was put in the public domain by various 
110 
 
 
 
groups, either maliciously or unknowingly. Such misinformation increases the spread 
of the disease and fatalities. Respondents noted that at the beginning of the crisis, the 
population was misinformed about the EVD; it was after the emergency management 
agencies got involved and changed the message before the rate of infections began to 
go down. Previous studies found in during the review of literature revealed that 
inadequate and misleading public education significantly contributed to the spread of 
the virus. Among the misinformation that put in the public domain  was that people 
should not eat bush meat, and a consumption ban was subsequently put in place in 
Guinea. This research revealed that beyond the misinformation on bushmeat, other 
wrong information that was out in the public domain in Liberia and Sierra Leone 
included; "When people are infected, and they go to the holding center, they will die;" 
"if you are exposed to someone who has the virus, you would die." Another negative 
information was "the moment you contract Ebola, you are dead." 
This misinformation kept many infected people who could have received 
proper care away from the holding centers, a situation that led to the death of many. 
The emergency management agencies later changed and repackaged the 
communication to; "when you come in contact with the virus or come in contact with 
somebody who has the virus, and you report yourself to the health worker or to a 
health facility or to a nearby center, you have a possibility, or there is a possibility 
you will not die." Another information was “If you just wear the plastic hand or the 
PPE and touch the stuff or infected people, that person will survive; it does not mean 
you will die;" and also "when you contract the virus and seek early treatment, there is 
a possibility for survival." 
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These communication and public education interventions from EMA 
significantly reduced the rate of infections. It is important to underscore that during 
the initial stages of infectious epidemics, emergency management agencies must 
collaborate with other institutions to ensure that the correct and accurate information 
is put in the public domain to ensure that the population is well educated on the risks 
involved, the right help available, and how much help can be received. This will 
reduce infections and reduce fatalities. 
Theme 3: Inclusion of Traditional and Religious Leaders 
Available literature on previous studies did not highlight the importance of 
including traditional and religious leaders in response to the Ebola crisis. In this study, 
however, the respondents indicated that one of the key strategies their agencies 
adopted was the inclusion of traditional and religious leaders in the response. The 
traditional leaders were used to mobilize the communities to create awareness and 
mobilize the communities to support the response to the Ebola crisis. It is important to 
note that identifying opinion leaders to get communities to support emergency 
management agencies in response to any disaster is crucial. Emergency management 
officials need to understand that they have their roles as emergency management 
experts, but without the buy-in of the communities, whatever plans irrespective of 
how well thought out it might not yield the expected results if they do not have the 
full support of the affected communities. Emergency management experts, therefore, 
need to identify popular opinion leaders within communities and include such leaders 
in their response plans even before a disaster happens. 
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Bearing in mind the theoretical framework, which guided this study, policy 
makers need to understand the interconnectedness of various segments of society and 
bring them together to achieve positive outcomes for the whole. In this study the 
responses from the participants did not only highlight the importance of recognizing 
the roles of other vital institutions such as traditional and religious leaders, but also 
bringing such institutions together and allowing them to play their crucial roles in 
response to the Ebola crisis.  
Theme 4: Whole Society Approach   
Engaging all the different facets of society is crucial in response to epidemics 
that have a high rate of infection and a very high fatality rate. In this study, the 
respondents indicated that employing the whole society approach helped in the 
response. The functionalist theory states that, “society is a system of interconnected 
parts that work together in harmony to maintain a state of balance and social 
equilibrium for the whole" (Mooney et al., 2007, p. 1). Bearing this theory in mind, 
EMAs need to understand that every society has its peculiarities. And it is significant 
for EM experts to identify the peculiar structures of the society and use those 
peculiarities in the emergency response. In responding to epidemics, a holistic kind of 
approach is necessary for making sure that every sector or every level of society is 
actively involved in preventing further spread of the epidemic. A holistic approach 
from national to regional as well as within the community levels is of utmost 
importance in managing crises such as the Ebola epidemic of 2014. 
The level of involvement should be based on what each segment of the society 
can do, and those segments should be included in the response plan. In Liberia, 
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though this was done later, the emergency managers agencies identified that the 
business community, school administrators, the local leaders, teachers, opinion 
leaders, religious bodies, and churches all had roles to play in the Ebola response. The 
inclusion of all these stakeholders contributed significantly to reducing the rate of 
infections. 
Theme 5: Control of Movement of People and Cultural Practices 
Among the first measures to be put in place when managing epidemics that 
spreads easily and has, the high mortality rate is to strictly ensure that the movement 
of people is controlled to contain and localize the disease before it spreads further. 
Previous literature on Ebola revealed that at the peak of the outbreak, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone governments rolled out measures including the imposition of a state of 
emergency, and quarantining large areas, to begin to tackle the epidemic. The 
respondents corroborated this assertion and indicated that although this measure was 
introduced later by the emergency management agencies, it was an important 
measure, which helped in reducing the spread of the virus in those countries. 
In addition, cultural practices, which are inimical to the response plan, need to 
be controlled or discouraged. According to Gbla (2018), many sociocultural and 
customary practices such as shaking hands, traditional ways of nursing the sick, 
initiation rites, and burial rituals were identified as major causes of the rates of Ebola 
transmission. Respondents in both Liberia and Sierra Leone indicated that the 
emergency management agencies played crucial roles in getting the communities to 
understand and subsequently changing such religious and cultural practices such as 
bathing of the dead, and dignified burial practices to halt the spread of the virus. 
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Significantly, when epidemics break out, it is important for emergency 
management agencies to quickly identify cultural and religious practices that may be 
inimical to the response plan. As part of the immediate response to epidemics, EMAs 
need to educate the population well enough to prevent further spread resulting from 
such practices. 
RQ2 
RQ2: What roles should nonmedical EMAs in Liberia and Sierra Leone and 
similar agencies in West Africa have played when responding to the 2014 Ebola 
crisis?  
Theme 6: Autonomy 
In this study, EMAs in both Liberia and Sierra Leone lacked autonomy during 
the crisis, a situation that contributed largely to the high mortality during the Ebola 
crisis.  Significantly, the mandated EMA in Liberia operated under the Ministry of 
Interior as the NDRC. In Sierra Leone, the EMA operated and continues to operate as 
a Department under the ONS. Respondents were of the professional opinion that as at 
the time the Ebola crisis began if the EMAs were properly set up with the appropriate 
autonomy and logistics support, these agencies could have contained the epidemic 
before it spiraled beyond control. 
 It is important to underscore that even within the ONS, the emergency 
management agency operates as just a department. Respondents were of the 
professional view that if there were an autonomous emergency management agency in 
Sierra Leone, the agency would have had the power to advise decision-makers against 
putting the management of the Ebola epidemic under the Ministry of Health. In 
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Liberia, All the respondents alluded to the fact that if an autonomous NDMA were in 
existence at the time of the crisis, the response would have been more effective and 
better coordinated.  
It is imperative for politicians, policy, and decision-makers to understand that 
disaster management agency, like any other professional body, has its roles to play as 
a unit of society. When such agencies are given a free hand to perform their mandated 
roles, in the society, their efficiency and experience increase with time to be able to 
discharge their responsibilities to develop societies efficiently. Further, keeping 
emergency agencies under government ministries dwarf the efforts of the emergency 
management experts, especially if the political authority finds the professional work 
of the emergency mangers as politically incorrect. 
Theme 7: Planning 
This research found that Ebola was never anticipated in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone before the epidemic struck. As a result, no plans were in place to contain such 
an epidemic in these countries.  Some respondents from Sierra Leone were emphatic 
that there were no response plans available to fall on during the crisis because Ebola 
was never anticipated. This state of affairs led to confusion at the early stages of the 
response leading to wrong decisions and subsequent fatalities. In Liberia, however, a 
National Influenza Plan was partly in place but in draft form. This plan was taken out 
of the shelves and updated at the peak of the crisis to respond to the epidemic. 
The correct identification of potential threats and hazards that could affect a 
country is important in preparing a requisite response plan. This research revealed that 
the consequences of the absence of an anticipated and a well thought out plan lead to 
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initial confusion and increased fatalities when an epidemic strikes. When emergency 
management agencies in countries are well set up and resourced, they can remain 
focused, undertake their unique mandated tasks as important segments of society, and 
contribute positively to the entire society.  
Policy and decision-makers must recognize the unique and important roles 
emergency management agencies play in society and resource such agencies 
appropriately.  It is important for emergency management agencies to do a more 
detailed analysis of global emergency issues and update their national disaster plans 
accordingly before epidemics strike. Such an approach will prevent initial confusion 
and subsequent mass fatalities when an epidemic such as the Ebola Virus Disease 
strikes. 
Theme 8: Border Control 
Previous studies indicated that African countries such as Cameroun, Gambia, 
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal stopped or limited air travels form all 
Ebola-infected countries (Gronke, 2015 p 16). Other countries such as South Africa 
refused entry to non-citizens and others on permanent residence status traveling from 
the infected countries (p. 16). These moves were viewed as a mere response to 
unfounded panic and stigmatization of nationals of the infected countries. However, 
respondents thought that the disaster management agencies of Liberia and Sierra 
Leone should have acted early enough to control movement across their borders to 
prevent the spread of the disease.  This view does not only corroborate the findings of 
the research regarding border controls but also leads to the fact that although other 
countries acted out of ignorance, fear, and stigmatization, such moves by these 
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countries were justified to the extent that it prevented the spread of the virus to their 
countries.  Further, Liberia and Sierra Leone, whose nationals were stigmatized and 
prevented from entering other countries, would have put in the same measures to 
prevent other nationals from entering their countries if they had the opportunity to 
prevent other infected nationals from entering their country. 
Among the revelations of this research was the fact that the emergency 
management agencies should have coordinated with other stakeholders and 
counterparts in the other infected countries to control the movement of people across 
the borders. The research revealed that due to the porous nature of borders between 
the infected countries, people moved uncontrollably from one country to the other, 
and in the process, spread the Ebola virus. 
When dealing with epidemics with high infectious and fatality rates such as 
EVD, emergency management agencies must collaborate with their counterparts to 
prevent the movement of people across borders to prevent further spread of the 
disease. Further, when epidemics such as the Ebola crisis happen elsewhere, it will be 
necessary for emergency management agencies to immediately coordinate with the 
appropriate agencies and put in border controls to prevent free movement of people 
from the infected countries to avoid transporting the disease across countries. 
Theme 9: ECOWAS  
Most of the respondents indicated that no emergency management agencies 
from sister West African countries moved in to help during the Ebola crisis, possibly 
due to fear of being infected. The respondents, however, indicated that NADMO of 
Ghana assisted with training and building the capacity of emergency management 
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expertise in West Africa after the crisis through collaboration with the KAIPTC. The 
study further revealed that, like the infected countries, ECOWAS as a sub-regional 
body was caught unawares when the crisis began. ECOWAS had no plans in place to 
deal with an epidemic at the magnitude of the Ebola Crisis. It is important EMAs of 
West African countries to come together not only to develop emergency plans 
together but also draw memoranda of understanding among themselves and have joint 
simulation exercises and pieces of training to be able to respond to a crisis in the sub-
region appropriately. 
Limitations of the Study 
The study was qualitative in nature with a focus on descriptive methods. The 
respondents were drawn from emergency management experts at different levels on 
the respective hierarchies of their organization. Although the study produced credible 
and detailed data on the roles of emergency management agencies during the Ebola 
crisis of 2014, the study unavoidably has some limitations. One of the key limitations 
of this study is the fact that the responses from participants were based on the 
subjective professional experience from the limited roles they played during the Ebola 
crisis. The responses from participants were, therefore, quite subjective and may not 
represent the actual state of affairs as far as leadership and decision making in the 
respective emergency management agencies were concerned. 
Another limitation of the study was that the researcher could not determine the 
level of bias of the respondents since the researcher did not collect data on how the 
Ebola crisis may have individually affected the respondents. There remains the 
possibility that respondents whose loved ones may have died because of the Ebola 
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crisis would be less objective considering the roles they thought their agencies should 
have played during the crisis. 
In addition, although the researcher invited seven emergency management 
experts from Liberia to be part of the study, only three of them willingly participated. 
Consequently, the professional views from respondents from Liberia may not wholly 
represent the functions of the emergency management agency of Liberia since other 
EM experts in Liberia who are in the majority may have different views regarding the 
roles played by their agency. In Sierra Leone, five out of seven emergency 
management experts participated. Therefore, a possibility remains that the other 
experts who did not participate in the study may hold contrary views to the responses 
from the participants. Furthermore, the researcher did not collect any data from the 
ECOWAS secretariat during the study. Therefore, the data collected from respondents 
in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana may not be an accurate position of ECOWAS 
regarding the roles ECOWAS played during the crisis. 
Additionally, the researcher could not determine if the respondents were 
truthful with their responses. Further, other stakeholders who played vital roles in 
response to the Ebola epidemic in Liberia and Sierra Leone were not included in the 
study. Consequently, there were no counter or corroborative views of other experts 
outside of emergency management organizations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ghana, 
who may have played critical roles during the Ebola crisis. 
In spite of these limitations, the results of the study are credible and 
trustworthy, because the data collection method and analysis were thorough. Data 
collection and analysis were also subjected to scrutiny by the supervising committee 
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of this study. Further, the researcher ensured that issues of trustworthiness were 
properly addressed in the study. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
The data collected during this study revealed that at the onset of the Ebola 
crisis, there was confusion and lack of direction due to misunderstanding and 
classification of the Ebola crisis as a health issue. This led to the ministries of health 
of the respective agencies assuming leadership in coordination. Previous studies did 
not address the actual relationships that existed between the respective ministries of 
health and emergency management agencies. In addition, this study does not address 
the level of cooperation that existed between disaster management agencies and 
respective Ministries of Health in Liberia and Sierra Leone before the Ebola crisis. It 
is therefore recommended that future research should focus on the level of 
coordination and cooperation that exists between emergency management agencies 
and ministries of health in the respective countries, with the view to streamlining that 
relationship to ensure effective leadership in coordination during a response to 
epidemics. 
Additionally, during the data collection, the researcher observed that some of 
the respondents were keen on describing their personal experiences, loss of their 
loved ones to the Ebola Virus, and the trauma emergency management experts went 
through during the Ebola crisis. During the review of the literature, the researcher did 
not come across any research on the trauma emergency management experts went 
through in the performance of their duties during the Ebola crisis. It will be 
worthwhile for a further study into the psychological trauma emergency management 
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experts went through during the 2014 Ebola crisis, and the impact such trauma may 
have had on the performance of their duties. 
Implications 
Implications for Social Change 
This study may contribute to social change in the area of policymaking at both 
international and national levels as well as for various emergency management 
experts in various countries.  The findings and recommendations of this study 
stipulate policy direction for ECOWAS at the international level concerning 
developing SOPs and MOU to bind disaster management agencies to respond to 
epidemics in various member states. At the national level, the findings and 
recommendations provide insight into giving autonomy to emergency management 
agencies and delinking these agencies from government ministries. At the 
organization level, the study highlights the importance of emergency management 
agencies to plan for unfamiliar hazards and establishing their authority at the initial 
stages of epidemics to lead the coordination efforts during the response to unfamiliar 
disasters.  
All these policy directions would contribute positively to social change 
through how non-medical emergency management agencies would respond to 
epidemics that afflict countries and transcend international boundaries in the future.  
Significantly, this study contributes positively to the body of knowledge on how 
emergency management agencies responded to the 2014 Ebola crisis in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. 
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Implications for Policymaking and Professional Practice 
As already mentioned in the impact this study will make on social change, the 
findings, recommendations of this study highlight the importance of this research for 
policymaking both at county and ECOWAS sub-regional level as well for 
professional practice by emergency management experts. 
Delinking EMAs from Government Agencies 
Delinking EMAs from government ministries and giving them autonomy is 
crucial for an effective and professional approach to emergency response. Keeping 
EMAs under government ministries dwarfs the efforts of the emergency management 
experts when emergencies occur.  When such agencies are given a free hand and the 
autonomy to perform their mandated roles in the society, their efficiency and 
experience increase with time in the discharge of their responsibilities to develop 
societies. It is important for politicians, policy, and decision-makers to understand 
that disaster management agencies, like any other professional body, have their roles 
to play as important components of society. 
Policymakers in countries that still have their emergency management 
agencies operating as departments and directorates under government ministries  
should, therefore, make efforts to have appropriate legislation passed to establish 
autonomous emergency management agencies and resource them appropriately to 
play their roles as important components of society. 
Planning for Unfamiliar Hazards 
Planning for disasters is an extremely important part of emergency 
management. Emergency management agencies must develop comprehensive plans to 
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include all stakeholders and exercise such plans before disasters occur.  Although an 
all-hazards approach to emergency management may suffice, when unfamiliar 
disasters occur, initial confusion among stakeholders in disaster management leads to 
several fatalities. Disaster management experts must, therefore, study the global trend 
of disasters and identify unfamiliar hazards in their countries that have the potential to 
not only afflict their countries but also has the potential to transcend international 
boundaries, and accordingly plan for them. 
Beyond planning, early warning mechanisms, timely information sharing, and 
effective border control are crucial in responding to epidemics that transcend 
international boundaries. Governments and policymakers should, therefore, 
adequately resource emergency management agencies to be able to deal with cross 
border epidemics effectively. 
Timely Initial Leadership in Coordination  
At the onset of the Ebola crisis, the Ministries of Health of Liberia and Sierra 
Leone took leadership in the coordination to the response. In Sierra Leone, it was not 
until the Ministry of Health was overwhelmed that a decision was made to set up the 
National Emergency Response Center, which was later managed by the ONS. It is 
imperative for policymakers and emergency management experts to exert their 
authority and take the early lead in coordinating the response to epidemics.  All 
stakeholders, including respective ministries of health, should realize that in 
emergency management, playing their properly ascribed functions in society for 
which they have been trained, leads to the collective success of a disaster 
management response plan. 
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According to the functionalist theory, upon which this study is based, "society 
is a system of interconnected parts that work together in harmony to maintain a state 
of balance and social equilibrium for the whole" (Mooney et al., 2007 p. 1). Ministries 
of Health should play their roles in case management and focus on the treatment of 
infected people, and leave the broader leadership in coordination to the competent 
emergency management professionals to handle. This can be achieved through the 
engagement of all stakeholders, ineffective planning for unfamiliar emergencies. 
Development of MOU and SOPs on EM for ECOWAS Member States 
In this study, it was evident that there are no sub-regional emergency 
management agencies in West Africa. It was equally clear there is no mechanism in 
place that bound emergency management agencies from respective ECOWAS 
countries to respond to epidemics in other member states and disasters that transcend 
international boundaries. ECOWAS as a sub-regional body should engage emergency 
management experts from member states to develop comprehensive Standard 
Operations Procedures and Memorandum of Understanding among the member states 
to commit them to respond to emergencies in the sub-region. Furthermore, disaster 
management agencies in West Africa should hold joint pieces of training and 
exercises to prepare themselves in readiness to respond to the crisis in the sub-region. 
Additionally, ECOWAS should set up an emergency management standby body as 
part of its headquarters to coordinate a response to disasters that affect member states.   
Conclusion 
This generic qualitative inquiry focused on the roles emergency management 
agencies played or should have played during the Ebola crisis of 2014. I had served in 
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Sierra Leone as a solider almost two decades ago and as an international civil servant 
in Liberia at the peak of the Ebola crisis. Therefore, when I embarked on this journey 
in my quest for higher academic laurels, I decided to conduct this study to contribute 
my quota to the body of knowledge in emergency management in these two 
wonderful countries. The researcher identified participants through purposive 
sampling and collected data from emergency management experts in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, as well as Ghana through interviews.  All the respondents willingly 
participated and provided very useful information for further analysis. I subsequently 
used an inductive thematic analysis approach to analyze the data. The findings of the 
research indicated that during the crisis, the roles, which were played by the 
emergency management agencies in the respective countries, included coordination 
and communication. The respective agencies also used strategies such as the inclusion 
of traditional and religious leaders, the whole society approach, and control of cultural 
practices and movement of people to effectively respond to the crisis. 
The research also established that the emergency management agencies in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone lacked autonomy and operated under government ministries 
under the names NDRC, and Department of Disaster Management in the ONS, 
respectively. The findings also showed that prior to the Ebola crisis, there were no 
plausible Ebola response plans in place not only in Liberia and Sierra Leone but also 
at the sub-regional level of ECOWAS. Respondents further indicated that border 
control was a strategy that should have been used to prevent the spread of the Ebola 
Virus Disease to other infected countries when the outbreak started in Guinea. 
Finally, the research established that emergency management agencies from 
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ECOWAS member states did not move to Liberia and Sierra Leone to support their 
counterparts in the response during the crisis. 
The recommendations in the studies include: the need to delinking emergency 
management agencies from government agencies, the requirement to plan for 
unfamiliar hazards; the importance of timely initial leadership in coordination; and the 
need for ECOWAS to development MOUs and SOPs on emergency management for 
the ECOWAS Member States. This research is significant and may provide policy 
direction to policymakers at the international and country levels as well as guidance 
for emergency management experts. 
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Appendix A:   Invitation Letter to Participants 
 
Dear ... (name of participant) ..... 
My name is Eugene Owusu Afrifa, and I am a doctoral student of Public Policy and 
Administration (Emergency Management) at Walden University of the United States 
of America. I am conducting a research on the topic “Ebola Outbreak in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone: Role of Non-Medical Emergency Management Agencies” I obtained 
your contact information from the Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training 
Center. I would like to invite you to participate in this study as a respondent. If you 
agree to participate, I will arrange an interview at a time and neutral public location of 
your convenience. The interview would last for about 45 minutes and will be very 
formal. My goal in this study will be to learn about the roles played by the mandated 
non-medical emergency management agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone, at the 
national level, and such similar agencies at the regional (West Africa) level in 
managing the Ebola epidemic of 2014.  I can assure you that I will share the results of 
the study with you. In addition, please note participation in this study is optional, and 
you may withdraw at any point of the process. 
I have provided further details of the study in the attached consent form. Your 
signature on this form means you understand the information I presented and you 
want to willingly participate. Please do not hesitate to contact me for any further 
clarification. 
  
Thank you. 
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Appendix B: Consent Form  
RQ1 
 
Dear ..... (Name of respondent)...... 
  
You are invited to take part in a research study about roles played by emergency 
management agencies during epidemics.  The title of the study is “Ebola Outbreak in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone: Role of Non-Medical Emergency Management Agencies”  
  
The researcher is inviting emergency management experts from Ghana, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. This form is part of a process called “informed consent” to make you 
understand this study before deciding whether to take part.  
  
Eugene Owusu Afrifa who is a PhD student at Walden University is conducting this 
study. You might already know the researcher as a professional field security 
coordination officer of the United Nations, but this study is completely different from 
that role.  
  
Background Information:  
The purpose of this qualitative study is to learn about the roles played by the mandated 
non-medical emergency management agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone, at the 
national level, and such similar agencies at the regional (West Africa) level in managing 
the Ebola epidemic of 2014  
  
Procedures:  
The interview will be audio recorded, and if you agree to be in this study, you will be 
asked to:   
  
⚫ Sign the informed consent form to indicate your willingness to participate in the 
interview process  
⚫ Grant a face-to-face interview with the researcher for about 45 minutes at a time 
and location convenient to you or via telephone.  
⚫ Discuss your understanding of the 2014 Ebola crisis in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
and how it was managed by non-medical emergency management agencies.  
⚫ Review the transcript of the recorded interview discussion to validate and correct 
your answers.  
  
The main research question is: How did the non-medical emergency management 
agencies of Liberia and Sierra Leone respond to the 2014 Ebola crisis?  
  
Sub questions will include:  
  
145 
 
 
 
⚫ What is your understanding of crisis response to an epidemic such as the Ebola 
crisis?  
⚫ What role did your agency play in responding to the Ebola  crisis?  
⚫ If your agency played any roles what strategy did they use?  
⚫ What roles do you think your agency should have played in responding to the 
crisis?  
⚫ Which other agencies do you think should have played key roles in the response?  
  
  
  
Voluntary Nature of the Study:  
This study is voluntary. You are free to accept or turn down the invitation. Any person 
or organization will not treat you differently if you decide not to be in the study. If you 
decide to be in the study now, you can still change your mind later.   
  
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:  
Being in this type of study involves some risk of the minor discomforts that can be 
encountered in daily life, such as recall of crisis experiences and being stressed. Being 
in this study would not pose a risk to your safety or wellbeing.  
  
 Although the research may not benefit you directly as an individual, it will contribute 
immensely to policymaking at national and regional levels with regard to the roles 
emergency management agencies would play in the management of future epidemics 
in countries as well as those that afflict a region such as West Africa.  
  
Payment:  
There are no payments or special gifts for participants for granting the interview. 
However, there will be an immediate cash reimbursement of up to an equivalent of 
Fifty US dollars (USD$50) for transportation to an agreed venue outside of your 
office premises.  
  
Privacy:  
Reports coming out of this study will not share the identities of individual participants. 
Details that might identify participants, such as the location of the study, also will not 
be shared. The researcher will not use your personal information for any purpose 
outside of this research project. Data will be kept secure with data security measures 
including password protection, data encryption, use of codes in place of names, and 
storing names separately from the data. Data will be kept for at least five years, as 
required by the university.  
  
Contacts and Questions:  
You may ask any questions you have now. Further, if you have questions later, you may 
contact the researcher via telephone number +234 (0)909 442 4211 or via WhatsApp 
on +233244 224 248. You may also reach the researcher via email address as 
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eugene.owusuafrifa@waldenu.edu. If you want to talk privately about your rights as a 
participant, you can call the Research Participant Advocate at my university at +1 612-
312-1210. Walden University's approval number for this study is 07-10-19-0662843 
and it expires on July 9, 2020.  
  
The researcher will give you a copy of this form to keep.   
  
Obtaining Your Consent  
  
If you understand the study well enough to decide it, please indicate your consent by 
signing below.  
  
Printed Name of Participant    
Date of consent    
Participant’s Signature    
Researcher’s Signature    
  
  
Thank you.  
  
  
Consent Form: RQ2 
Dear ..... (Name of respondent)...... 
  
You are invited to take part in a research study about roles played by emergency 
management agencies during epidemics.  The title of the study is “Ebola Outbreak in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone: Role of Non-Medical Emergency Management Agencies”  
  
The researcher is inviting emergency management experts from Ghana, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. This form is part of a process called “informed consent” to make you 
understand this study before deciding whether to take part.  
  
Eugene Owusu Afrifa who is a PhD student at Walden University is conducting this 
study. You might already know the researcher as a professional field security 
coordination officer of the United Nations, but this study is completely different from 
that role.  
  
Background Information:  
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The purpose of this qualitative study is to learn about the roles played by the mandated 
non-medical emergency management agencies in Liberia and Sierra Leone, at the 
national level, and such similar agencies at the regional (West Africa) level in managing 
the Ebola epidemic of 2014  
  
Procedures:  
The interview will be audio recorded, and if you agree to be in this study, you will be 
asked to:   
  
⚫ Sign the informed consent form to indicate your willingness to participate in the 
interview process  
⚫ Grant a face-to-face interview with the researcher for about 30 minutes at a time 
and location convenient to you or via telephone.  
⚫ Discuss your understanding of the 2014 Ebola crisis in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
and how it was managed by non-medical emergency management agencies.  
⚫ Review the transcript of the recorded interview discussion to validate and correct 
your answers.  
  
The main research question is;    
  
How effective was the emergency management response to the Ebola pandemic at the 
national and regional levels?  
  
Sub questions will include  
  
⚫ If your agency played any key roles, how successful were the strategies used?  
⚫ Could there be any other plausible strategy that was not used or could have been 
used?  
⚫ Did other emergency management agencies in West Africa assist in the response?  
⚫ Was there any intervention from the Economic Community of West Africa States 
(ECOWAS)?  
⚫ How did your response help in dealing with the crisis?  
⚫ How did ECOWAS response help in dealing with the crisis?  
  
  
  
Voluntary Nature of the Study:  
This study is voluntary. You are free to accept or turn down the invitation. Any person 
or organization will not treat you differently if you decide not to be in the study. If you 
decide to be in the study now, you can still change your mind later.   
  
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study:  
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Being in this type of study involves some risk of the minor discomforts that can be 
encountered in daily life, such as recall of crisis experiences and being stressed. Being 
in this study would not pose a risk to your safety or wellbeing.  
  
 Although the research may not benefit you directly as an individual, it will contribute 
immensely to policymaking at national and regional levels with regard to the roles 
emergency management agencies would play in the management of future epidemics 
in countries as well as those that afflict a region such as West Africa.  
  
Payment:  
There are no payments or special gifts for participants for granting the interview. 
However, there will be an immediate cash reimbursement of up to an equivalent of 
Fifty US dollars (USD$50) for transportation to an agreed venue outside of your 
office premises.  
  
Privacy:  
Reports coming out of this study will not share the identities of individual participants. 
Details that might identify participants, such as the location of the study, also will not 
be shared. The researcher will not use your personal information for any purpose 
outside of this research project. Data will be kept secure with data security measures 
including password protection, data encryption, use of codes in place of names, and 
storing names separately from the data. Data will be kept for at least five years, as 
required by the university.  
  
Contacts and Questions:  
You may ask any questions you have now. Further, if you have questions later, you may 
contact the researcher via telephone number +234 (0)909 442 4211 or via WhatsApp 
on +233244 224 248. You may also reach the researcher via email address as 
eugene.owusuafrifa@waldenu.edu. If you want to talk privately about your rights as a 
participant, you can call the Research Participant Advocate at my university at +1 612-
312-1210. Walden University's approval number for this study is 07-10-19-0662843 
and it expires on July 9, 2020.  
  
The researcher will give you a copy of this form to keep.   
  
Obtaining Your Consent  
  
If you understand the study well enough to decide it, please indicate your consent by 
signing below.  
  
Printed Name of Participant    
Date of consent    
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Participant’s Signature    
Researcher’s Signature    
  
  
Thank you.  
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
